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NOTES
Enjoining the Application of the British Protection of Trading
Interests Act in Private American Antitrust Litigation
"I admit that our approach . . . is rather
novel and will, no doubt, cause a fair
amount of fluttering in the legal
dovecotes. ,,
- British Secretary of State for
Trade, John Nott 1

Great Britain has often objected2 to the 'Juridical imperialism"3
reflected in the American antitrust laws, 4 but its new Protection of
Trading Interests Act5 (PTIA) represents the most significant departure yet from the quiet, behind-the-scenes approach adopted in earlier British protests.6 The British believe that the Clayton Act's
1. 973 PARL. DEB., H.C. (5th ser.) 1544 (1979) (remarks of British Secretary of State for
Trade John Nott). Studies of the new Act have already begun to appear in the literature. See
Danaher, Anti-Antitrust Law: The Clawhack and Other Features ofthe United Kingdom Protection of Trading Interests Act, 1980, 12 LAW & POLY. INTL. Bus. 947 (1980); Gordon, Extraterritorial Application ofthe United States Economic Laws: Britain .Draws the Line, 14 INTL. LAW,
151 (1980); Huntley, The Protection ofTrading Interests Act 1980: Somejurisdictional aspects of
enforcement of antitrust laws, 30 INTL. & COMP. L.Q. 213 (1981); Jones, Protection of Trading
Interests Act 1980, 40 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 41 (1981); Lowe, Blocking Extraterritorial Jurisdiction:
The British Protection of Trading Interests Act, 1980, 15 AM. J. INTL. L. 257 (1981); Note, The
British Protection of Trading Interests Act of 1980: An Analysis, 14 J. INTL, L. & ECON. 253
(1980); Comment, The Protection of Trading Interests Act of 1980: Britain's Response lo V.S.
Extraterritorial Antitrust Enforcement, 2 Nw. J. INTL. L. & Bus. 476 (1980).
2. See, e.g., British Nylon Spinners Ld. v. Imperial Chem. Indus. Ld., [1953) 1 Ch. 19 (Ch.
App. 1952) (the "I.C.I." case), where the British court held valid a multimillion-dollar British
patent licensing contract that an American court had invalidated because it violated the antitrust laws. See United States v. Imperial Chem. Indus., Ltd., 105 F. Supp. 215 (S.D.N.Y.
1952). For a more general discussion of the early history of the antitrust debate, see 1 J.
ATWOOD & K. BREWSTER, ANTITRUST AND AMERICAN BUSINESS ABROAD§ 4 (2d ed. 1981).
For an early and moderate presentation of the British point of view, see Jennings, Extraterritorial Jurisdiction and the United States Antitrust Laws, 33 BRIT. Y.B. INTL. L. 146 (1957). A
recent judicial expression of the British view appears in Rio Tinto Zinc Corp. v. Westinghouse
Elec. Corp., [1978) A.C. 547, 615-17 (1977) (rejecting request in American letters rogatory for
production of documents for United States antitrust trial).
3. 976 PARL. DEB., H.C. (5th ser.) 1028 (1979) (remarks of Charles Fletcher-Cooke). See
N.Y. Times, Nov. 1, 1979, § D, at 11, col. 1 (Secretary of State for Trade John Nott stating that
purpose of the new Bill is to counter "American economic imperialism").
4. Section l of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 12(a) (1976) defines "antitrust 11\,WS" to include, inter alia, the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1976), the other sections of the Clayton
Act, and§§ 73-76 of the Wilson Tariff Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 8-11 (1976).
5. Protection of Trading Interests Act, 1980, c. 11. The Act became law on March 20, 1980.
981 PARL. DEB. H.C. (5th ser.) 700 (1980).
6. See 973 PARL. DEB., H.C. (5th ser.) 1533 (1979) (remarks of John Nott). The British
government sent the United States a diplomatic note to the effect that "these measures only
come after repeated attempts to settle these matters by diplomatic means - attempts which
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imposition of treble damages7 on British corporations for acts done
largely outside of the United States8 infringes upon British sovereignty9 and violates international law. 10 The new Act gives this view
the force of positive law: Its sixth section authorizes a losing British
antitrust defendant to sue a prevailing American plaintiff in Britain
for the return of the non.compensatory two thirds of the award. 11
This provision threatens to undermine the integrity of the treble
damages award, a cornerstone of American antitrust enforcement. 12
The PTIA applies to a small but important class of private Amerhave continued over many years . . . ." See PARL. DEB., H.C. STANDING COMM. F., Dec. 4,
1979, at 33 (remarks of John Nott).
7. Section 4 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1976), provides:
[A]ny person who shall be injured in his business or property by reason of anything forbidden in the antitrust laws may sue therefor in any district court of the United States in
the district in which the defendant resides or is found or has an agent, without respect to
the amount in controversy, and shall recover threefold the damages by him sustained, and
the cost of suit, including a reasonable attorney's fee.
8. The doctrine in American law to which the British particularly object is the "effects"
test, first propounded by Learned Hand in United States v. Aluminum Co. of America (Alcoa),
148 F.2d 416, 443 (2d Cir. 1945): "[I]t is settled law . . . that any state may impose liabilities,
even upon persons not within its allegiance, for conduct outside its borders that has consequences within its borders which the state reprehends." See 973 PARL. DEB., H.C. (5th ser.)
1541 (1979) (remarks of fohn Nott) ("Our objection arises . . . at the point when a country
attempts to achieve the maximum beneficial regulation of its own economic environment by
ensuring that all those having any contact with it abide by its laws and legal principles.").
9. See, e.g., Rio Tinto Zinc Corp. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., [1978] A.C. 547, 616 (1977).
The sovereignty argument, however, was never pressed too hard in Parliament. See PARL.
DEB., H.C. STANDING COMM. F., Dec. 4, 1979, at 19-20 (remarks of John Nott) ("I do not
doubt that there have been occasions on which the United Kingdom has sought to exercise
extra-territorial jurisdiction; I should be amazed if we had not.").
IO. "International law" is an ambiguous term. To violate international law, an act may:
(I) violate a ruling of the International Court of Justice; (2) violate generally accepted norms
of behavior for "civilized" nations; or (3) simply show a "politically unwise disrespect for the
interests and prerogatives of other nations." K. BREWSTER, ANTITRUST AND AMERICAN BUSINESS ABROAD 286 (1st ed. 1958). A United States court may ignore international law unless it
is also American law. See Zenith Radio Corp. v. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., 494 F. Supp.
1161, 1178-79 (E.D. Pa. 1980). A recent British attempt to rely upon international law in an
American antitrust case did not succeed and helped to cause a minor diplomatic incident. See
In re Uranium Antitrust Litigation, 617 F.2d 1248, 1256 (7th Cir. 1980) ("[S]hockingly to us,
the governments of the defaulters have subserviently presented for them their case against the
exercise of jurisdiction."); Letter from Roberts B. Owen, Legal Advisor, United States Department of State, to John Shenefield, Associate Attorney General, United States Department of
Justice (Mar. 17, 1980), forwarded to Thomas F. Strubbe, Clerk of the United States Court of
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit (Mar. 18, 1980), reprinted in Gill, Two Cheersfar Timberlane,
REVUE SUISSE DU DROIT INTERNATIONAL DE LA CONCURRENCE, Sept. 1980, at 19-20 ("For
reasons that may not have been apparent to the Court, this language has caused serious embarrassment to the United States in its relations with some of our closest allies.").
11. The Act reads in pertinent part: "[T]he qualifying defendant shall be entitled to recover from the party in whose favour the judgment was given so much of the . . . [''.judgment
for multiple damages"] as exceeds the part attributable to compensation." Protection of Trading Interests Act, 1980, c. 11, § 6(2) (referring back to § 5(3)). The cause of action resists
categorization. See note 131 infra.
12. See notes 37-47 infra and accompanying text. See generally Antitrust Symposium: The
Effectiveness o:f the Private Treble JJamages Action as an Antitrust Eeforcement Mechanism, 8
Sw. U. L. R.Ev. 505 (1976).
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ican antitrust cases. 13 There are three main prerequisites to its application. First, the party instituting the clawback suit must be a
"qualifying defendant" - a citizen or corporation of the United
Kingdom, or an entity that both "carr[ies] on business in the United
Kingdom" and does not have its principal place of business in the
United States. 14 Second, no defendant may invoke the Act for "activities exclusively carried on" within the United States. 15 And third,
the Act effectively applies only against a plaintiff that has attachable
assets in Great Britain16 and "in whose favour the judgment was
given." 17 Although the drafters deliberately introduced considerable
uncertainty into the Act, 18 it typically applies when a British company actively engaged in trading with the United States loses a treble
damage suit to a plaintiff with vulnerable British assets. 19 The main
exception to the typical case - the Act does not apply to British
subsidiaries of an American-based parent20 - should prove insignif13. This Note will refer to the parties according to their status in the typical American
antitrust case described in the text at note 19 infra.
14. The pertinent section provides:
This section applies where a court of an overseas country has given a judgment for
multiple damages . . . against (a) a citizen of the United Kingdom and Colonies; or
{b) a body corporate incorporated in the United Kingdom . . . ; or
(c) a person carrying on business in the United Kingdom,
(in this section referred to as a "qualifying defendant") . . . .
Protection of Trading Interests Act, 1980, c. 11, § 6(1). Thus a corporation from any country
may qualify under the Act by carrying on some sort of business within the United Kingdom.
See PARL. DEB., H.C. STANDING COMM. F, Dec. 6, 1979, at 71-74 (colloquy between John
Nott and Eric Ogden). Section 6(3) then qualifies§ 6(1) by excluding individuals "ordinarily
resident in the overseas country" and corporations that have their "principal place of business
there" at the time of the offense. The question of what constitutes "carrying on business"
under British law lies beyond the scope of this Note.
15. Protection of Trading Interests Act, 1980, c. 11, § 6(4). The meaning of "exclusively
carried on" is open to a variety of interpretations. When politely asked whether "exclusive is
exclusive, period," the British Attorney General, Sir Michael Havers, replied not very helpfully, "We are trying to distinguish what one might call a wholly domestic operation within the
United States jurisdiction." PARL. DEB., H.C. STANDING CoMM. F, Dec. 6, 1979, at 70-71
(colloquy between David Crouch and Attorney General Sir Michael Havers). The drafters
apparently had in mind instances in which a subsidiary of a British parent carried on "all its
activities" within the United States "and nowhere else." Id at 71 (remarks of Sir Michael
Havers).
16. See 404 PARL. DEB., H.L. (5th ser.) 579 (1980) (remarks of Lord Renton); The Daily
Telegraph, Nov. I, 1979, at 21, col. 2 (qualifying antitrust defendant can "seize assets and
goods of United States concerns in this country"); Comment, supra note I, at 499 (1980).
17. Protection of Trading Interests Act, 1980, c. 11, § 6(2). For the text, see note 11 supra.
18. Secretary of State for Trade John Nott, for example, said of one provision: "I am
anxious not to have too close a definition simply because we might exclude something." PARL.
DEB., H.C. STANDING COMM. F, Dec. 6, 1979, at 75 (remarks of John Nott).
19. See, e.g., Financial Times (London), Nov. I, 1979, at 10, col. 7; N.Y. Times, Nov. I,
1979, § D, at 11, col. I (report of news conference given by John Nott); Wall St. J., Mar. 24,
1980, at 12, col. 3; Wash. Post, Nov. 4, 1979, § C, at 6, col. I (Editorial Page).
20. See, e.g., 976 PARL. DEB., H.C. (5th ser.) 1034-35 (1979) (colloquy between John Nott
and Jeffrey Thomas). Since a prevailing American corporate plaintiff and its subsidiary are
not the same juridical person under British law, see Salomon v. Salomon & Co., (1897) A.C. 22
(1896) (leading case); F. GORE-BROWNE, GORE-BROWNE ON COMPANIES § 1(4) (43d ed. A.
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icant in practice. 21
The Act's real importance lies not in its actual implementation,
but in a British defendant's power to invoke it. Most antitrust cases
are settled.22 The Act's drafters did not anticipate that a significant
number of American antitrust judgments would be clawed back;
rather, they designed the Act primarily to encourage "out-of-court
settlements at realistic levels."23 Even if the Act is never actually
used, in other words, its in terrorem effect alone should insulate all
British defendants from the full force of section 4 of the Clayton
Boyle 1977); L. GOWER, THE PRINCIPLES OF MODERN COMPANY LAW 194-200 (3d ed. 1969);
976 P ARL. DEB., H.C. (5th ser.) 1033 (1979) (remarks of John Nott) ("[I]n English law we assert
the corporate separateness of the holding company and its subsidiary."), the parent could
evade the Act by carrying on its British operations through a subsidiary, see, e.g., PARL. DEB.,
H.C. STANDING COMM. F, Dec. 6, 1979, at 68 (remarks of Attorney General Sir Michael Havers) ("In this country we require that a company carrying on business within the jurisdiction
has itself to carry on business. It will not be enough that it has an ownership of shares in a
subsidiary."); 976 PARL DEB., H.C. (5th ser.) 1034 (1979) (remarks of Jeffrey Thomas) ("We
are concerned that American companies, under the clause as drafted, could operate in this
country through subsidiary companies and slip through the net. A coach and horses would be
driven through the main purpose of the Bill."). Jeffrey Thomas proposed closing the subsidiary loophole in committee, but the government refused to take so extreme a step. PARL. DEB.,
H.C. STANDING COMM. F, Dec. 6, 1979, at 66-69 (amendment No. 27 withdrawn). Thomas
complained about the loophole until the very end of the Bill's five-month passage through
Parliament. 980 PARL. DEB., H.C. (5th ser.) 1110 (1980) (remarks of Jeffrey Thomas). The
government's position throughout remained simply that § 6 "achieves something and is a symbol of the area in which we wish to move." 404 PARL. DEB., H.L. (5th ser.) 593 (1980) (remarks of Lord Mackay).
21. Most American plaintiffs will either find it impracticable to do business through a subsidiary, see also Ongman, Is Somebody Crying "Wo!f'?: An Assessment of Whether Antitrust
Impedes Export Trade, I Nw. J. INTL. L. & Bus. 163, 200-01 (1979) (problems of small exporters), or will discover that their shares in the subsidiary and even their right to collect dividends
from it may be confiscated in absentia. Section 6(5) of the Act, Protection of Trading Interests
Act, 1980, c. 11, § 6(5), provides for long-arm style service of process, and the British rules of
civil procedure provide that to satisfy a judgment the court may seize "any stock of any company registered under any general Act of Parliament . . . [and) any dividend of or interest
payable on such stock." R. SUP. CT. 50(2)(3), 1965 STAT. INST. 4995, 5144. See Danaher,
supra note 1, at 960 n.94 ("[T]he United Kingdom might . . . permit attachment of all the
property of the parent located in the United Kingdom - including shares of stock in the
subsidiary and income streams in the form of dividends, royalties or licences."); Financial
Times (London), Mar. 22, 1980, at 4, col 5 ("Such assets would include export shipments, or
shares in a subsidiary."); N.Y. Times, Nov. 1, 1979, § D, at 11, col 2 (''These [vulnerable]
assets would have to be those of the parent company, perhaps its shares of a British subsidiary
").

....

22. See Collen, Procedural Directions in Antitrust Treble Damage Litigation: An Overview

of Changing Judicial Attitudes, 17 ANTITRUST BULL. 997, 998 (1972); Hartzell, Evans &
Eakeley, Defense of Government and Private Antitrust Cases, in ANTITRUST ADVISER 837 (2d
ed. 1978); Posner,A Statistical Study ofAntitrust Enforcement, 13 J.L. & EcoN. 365,383 (1970);
Withrow & Larm, The "Big" Antitrust Case: Twenty-jive Years of Sisyphean Labor, 62 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 6-8 {1976).

23. Wall St. J., Nov. 2, 1979, at 26, col 3. Lord Hacking explained to his colleagues in
committee that the principal function of the Act would be to provide leverage for British defendants to use in settlement negotiations. 404 PARL. DEB., H.L. (5th ser.) 1541 (1980). Hacking brought special expertise into the debate as a member both of the House of Lords and of
the New York bar. PERSPECTIVES ON THE EXTRATERRITORIAL APPLICATION OF U.S. ANTITRUST AND OTHER LAWS, at viii (J. Griffin ed. 1979).
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Act.24
This Note argues that American courts should mitigate the impact of the PTIA on American antitrust litigation by enjoining British defendants from pursuing their rights under the Act. Part I
examines the Act's principal effects on antitrust enforcement and the
settlement process, and concludes that these effects are serious
enough to warrant judicial intervention. Part II establishes a court's
power to issue transnational antisuit injunctions, and considers the
propriety of doing so. After briefly rejecting two practical objections
to such injunctions - that they are impossible to enforce and will
provoke international retaliation - Part II analyzes the doctrine of
comity - the deference that American courts accord the laws and
courts of other nations - and finds that it does not demand that
courts refuse to enjoin parties from bringing suit under the PTIA.
The Note then concludes that since courts lack the authority to
change the antitrust laws to accommodate the views of the British,
ultimate responsibility for resolving the dispute rests with Congress.
I. THE EFFECTS OF THE ACT AND THE NEED FOR RELIEF
The PTIA represents Britain's most recent effort "to reassert and
reinforce the defences of the United Kingdom against attempts by
other countries to enforce their economic and commercial policies
unilaterally on us." 25 But the American antitrust laws, against which
the Act is primarily directed, express values that are fundamental to
the American economy.26 These laws may well be "the Magna
Carta of free enterprise."27 By eliminating two thirds of a plaintiff's
recovery in fully litigated cases and substantially reducing the settlement value of all other cases against British defendants,
the PTIA will have far-reaching effects on American antitrust
enforcement.
The Act affects most directly those successful plaintiffs against
whom clawback suits are instituted. It establishes a cause of action
that may be loosely termed a tort of successful litigation, and provides no defenses. 28 Vulnerable plaintiffs will lose a major portion
of the awards to which the Clayton Act explicitly entitles them. 29
24. Clayton Act § 4, 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1976).
25. 973 PARL. DEB., H.C. (5th ser.) 1533 (1979) (remarks of John Nott).
26. See United States v. First Natl. City Bank, 396 F.2d 897, 903 (2d Cir. 1968).
27. United States v. Topco Assocs., Inc., 405 U.S. 596, 610 (1972) ("Antitrust laws ••. are
the Magna Carta of free enterprise. They are as important to the preservation of economic
freedom and our free-enterprise system as the Bill of Rights is to the protection of our fundamental personal freedoms."). Bui see R. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX (1978); R. POSNER,
ANTITRUST LAW (1976).
28. Unless one of the Act's two •~urisdictional" exceptions apply, Protection of Trading
Interests Act, 1980, c. 11, § 6(3)-(4), a qualifying defendant is "entitled" to recover. Protection
of Trading Interests Act, 1980, c. 11, § 6(2).
29. Clayton Act § 4, 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1976).
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Under these circumstances, the statutorily mandated treble damages
award would be tantamount to an award of only simple damages.
Fortunately, Jiowever, the British government does not foresee its
courts' o!dering the return of judgments rendered in the United
States.30
Because most British defendants will settle, few treble damage
judgments will be entered, and the PTIA's real impact will be felt in
pretrial negotiations.31 The Act carries the obvious potential for at
once protracting32 and complicating33 antitrust litigation, while diminishing a plaintiff's expected ultimate return. 34 Parliament has
thus substantially improved the bargaining position of British defendants in American antitrust litigation. Defendants, secure in the
knowledge that treble damages are a hollow threat, will spurn previously attractive settlement offers; plaintiffs, fa~ed with the prospect
of enormously expensive35 litigation from which they will ultimately
receive only their actual damages, will be forced to settle for a fraction of the former value of their claims.
By changing potential plaintiffs' cost-benefit calculations,36 the
PTIA will reduce the vigor and effectiveness of antitrust enforcement. Because the Act leaves intact the compensatory portion of an
antitrust award, 37 it challenges not so much the general economic
policies of the antitrust laws as it does their enforcement in private
treble damages suits. Although American plaintiffs can count on
keeping one third of their awards, this result would do violence to
the Clayton Act's enunciated "legislative purpose in creating a group
of 'private attorneys general' to enforce the antitrust laws."38 Private
suits are far more numerous than the cases initiated by the Justice
Department,39 and have come to play a pivotal role in antitrust en30. Wall St. J., Nov. 2, 1979, at 26, col 3. See note 23 supra. But if a qualifying defendant
sues an American plaintiff, the British court may have no choice but to order clawback. See
note 28 supra; Lowe, supra note I, at 277 (1981).
31. See text at notes 22-23 supra.
32. In addition to the time that a suit under the PTIA would itself take, a possible counterinjunction would further protract the litigation. See text at notes 109-21 infra.
33. Since the provisions of the PTIA are themselves replete with uncertainty, see note 18
supra and accompanying text, the settlement negotiations, if any, would also be complicated.
34. See Protection of Trading Interests Act, 1980, c. 11, § 6(2).
35. See Alioto, The Economics of a Treble .Damages Case, 32 ANTITRUST L.J. 87, 92-93
(1966). See generally K. ELZINGA & W. BREIT, THE ANTITRUST PENALTIES 63-77 (1976).
36. See Comment, supra note I, at 513.
37. Protection of Trading Interests Act, 1980, c. 11, § 6(2).
38. Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720, 746 (1977) (citations omitted). See Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. ·477, 485 (1977); Perma Life Mufflers, Inc. v.
International Parts Corp., 392 U.S. 134, 138-39 (1968); Lehrman v. Gulf Oil Corp., 500 F.2d
659, 667 (5th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 929 (1975).
39. According to the Annual Report of the Administrative Office of the United States
Court for the twelve-month period ending June 30, 1980, private suits are about 185 times
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forcement. 40 Without the prospect of treble damages, private parties
often41 would lack sufficient "incentive . . . to instigate costly and
uncertain litigation."42 The private action would then no longer provide "an ever-present threat to deter anyone contemplating business
behavior in violation of the antitrust laws."43 This result would not
change even if private parties pursued antitrust violators as vigorously as ever. British defendants would still be more inclined to engage in anticompetitive behavior than would American defendants
because simple damages deter far less effectively than treble damages.44 British companies could violate the law secure in the knowledge that at the very most they would have to disgorge their gains.
The Act thus challenges the clearly articulated policies of Congress,45 the courts,46 and the Justice Department.47
The PTIA mainly calls into question the importance of enforcing
the antitrust laws in foreign trade. Since the Act excludes "activities
exclusively carried on within the United States,"48 it effectively applies only in international transactions. The Act thus directly attacks
the jurisdictional provisions of the Clayton and Sherman Acts,
which proscribe anticompetitive conduct in "trade or commerce . . .
with foreign nations." 49 The question, then, is whether private treble
damages suits brought under the "foreign commerce" provisions of
the antitrust laws play an important part in furthering competition in
the United States. International antitrust enforcement is controversial.50 Transnational suits may not be worth what they cost the
more numerous than suits brought by the Justice Department. See [1980] TRADE REG, REP.
(CCH) No. 462, Nov. 3, 1980, at 7.
40. Mitchell, Plaint!fl's Prosecution ofFederal Treble J}amage and Injunction Cases, in AN·
TITRUST ADVISER, supra note 22, at 684.
41. The British believe, however, that even without treble damages the American system of
permitting class actions to be brought by attorneys who work on a contingency fee basis would
still produce an unacceptably high number of antitrust judgments against British defendants.
See PARL. DEB., H.C. STANDING COMM. F., Dec. 6, 1979, at 44-45, 53-54 (colloquy between
David Crouch and Attorney General Michael Havers).
42. Lehrman v. Gulf Oil Corp., 500 F.2d 659,667 (5th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 929
(1975).
43. Perma Life Mufflers, Inc. v. International Parts Corp., 392 U.S. 134, 139 (1968).
44. See note 38 supra. For critical studies of the relationship between treble damages and
deterrence, see K. ELZINGA & w. BREIT, supra note 35, at 63-96; R. POSNER, ANTITRUST LAw,
supra note 27, at 221-36.
45. See S. REP. No. 619, 84th Cong., 1st Sess. 2-4, reprinted in (1955] U.S. CoDE CONG. &
AD. NEWS 2328, 2329-30.
46. See note 38 supra and accompanying text.
41. See ANTITRUST DIVISION, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, ANTITRUST
GUIDE FOR INTERNATIONAL OPERATIONS 1-9 (1977) [hereinafter cited as ANTITRUST GUIDE].
48. See note 15 supra and accompanying text.
49. Sherman Act§§ 1-2, IS U.S.C. §§ 1-2 (1976); Clayton Act § I, 15 U.S.C. § 12 (1976).
See Pfizer, Inc. v. Government of India, 434 U.S. 308, 313 n.11 (1978).
50. This issue has been the subject of countless symposia, see, e.g., PERSPECTIVES, supra
note 23; Symposium, American Antitrust Law and Foreign Governments, 13 J. INT. L. & EcoN.
137 (1978); The Basis of International Antitrust: Proceedings of "Antitrust Aspects of lntema-
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United States abroad,5I but both the courts52 and the Justice Department53 agree that effective domestic enforcement often depends
heavily on vigorous international enforcement. Recognizing that the
two stand or fall together, the courts have given foreign nations
standing to sue under section 4,54 and have construed the act-of-state
doctrine narrowly to enable American plaintiffs to sue foreign govtional Transactions", 5 N.C. J. INTL. L. & CoM. REG. 1 (1980); Symposium, Transnational
Issues in American Antitrust Law, 2 Nw. J. INTL. L. & Bus. 334 (1980), and law review articles,
see, e.g., Jennings, supra note 2; Kintner & Griffin, Jurisdiction Over Foreign Commerce Under
the Sherman Antitrust Act, 18 B.C. INDUS. & CoM. L. REv. 199 (1977); Ongman, "Be No
Longer Chaos''.· Constructing a Normative Theory of the Sherman Act's Extraterritorial Jurisdictional Scope, 71 Nw. U. L. REv. 733 (1977); Rahl, Foreign Commerce Jurisdiction of the
American Antitrust Laws, 43 ANTITRUST L.J. 521 (1974), and, with the recent enactment of the
PTIA, promises to become the subject of even more heated debate, see note 1 supra. Canada
apparently plans to enact similar legislation, (1980] ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA)
No. 973, July 17, 1980, at A-19 to -20 (report that enactment of a "Foreign Proceedings and
Judgments Bill" may be expected in due course), and a meeting of some forty commonwealth
Attorneys General has endorsed the PTIA in principle, (1980] ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP.
(BNA) No. 963, May 8, 1980, at A-10. The Australian clawback bill, recently introduced into
Parliament, would claw back not just two thirds of the American judgment, but the entire
amount. See (1981] ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) No. 1019, June 18, 1981, at A-17.
See generally Nygh, Enforcement of United Stales Antitrust Judgments in Australia, 16 GONZ.
L. REV. 1, 20 (1980).
51. The disadvantages of vigorous international enforcement may be greater than they first
appear. The diplomatic disadvantages, expressed in the PTIA itself, are obvious. See, e.g.,
Burnham, Data Show U.S. Refected Uranium Cartel Prosecution, N.Y. Times, Dec. 4, 1979, at
1, col. 2 (possibility of "diplomatic furor" if international suit vigorously prosecuted); Note
from the Embassy of the United Kingdom to the United States State Department, Oct. 1, 1979,
reprinted in Energy Anlimonopoly Act of1979, S. 1246: Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on
the Judiciary, pt. 2, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 902-04 (1979) (subject of hearing subsequently
redesignated the Oil Windfall Acquisition Act of 1979) [hereinafter cited as Senate Oil Hearings] (diplomatic protest of the United Kingdom to the international application of proposed
antimerger statute).
There may also be economic disadvantages. The principal drawback appears to be the
chilling effect that that international enforcement may have on United States export trading.
See generally Ongman, supra note 21; J. TOWNSEND, EXTRATERRITORIAL ANTITRUST (1980).
The Senate has recently conducted hearings on the matter. See SENATE COMM. ON GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS, COMMISSION ON THE INTERNATIONAL APPLICATION OF THE U.S. ANTITRUST LAWS, s. REP. No. 96-770, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 5-6 (1980) (report on proposed bill No.
S. 1010) ("The Committee has been troubled by widespread complaints that the application of
these [antitrust] laws may have straightjacketed U.S. firms in international trade.").
52. See notes 54-58 infra. Courts commonly apply the antitrust laws in international trade.
See, e.g., Continental Ore Co. v. Union Carbide & Carbon Corp., 370 U.S. 690 (1962);
Timken Roller Bearing Corp. v. United States, 341 U.S. 593 (1951); United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945). See generally J. ATWOOD & K. BREWSTER,
supra note 2; w. FUGATE, FOREIGN COMMERCE AND THE ANTITRUST LAWS (2d ed. 1973).
53. The Justice Department vigorously supports ~titrust enforcement in international
transactions. See ANTITRUST GUIDE, supra note 47, at 1-9. A recent head of the Antitrust
Division remarked that the Department takes this position "because the economic arguments
are convincing, the potential harm is great and the policy enunciated by our legislature is
unequivocal." Shenefield, The Perspective ofthe U.S. Department ofJustice, in PERSPECTIVES,
supra note 23, at 14. See Birenbaum & Johnson, U.S. Law Under Fire, N.Y. Times, Nov. 26,
1979, at 21, cols. 1, 2 ("[L]aw that stops at the water's edge may well stop short of fulfilling its
national function.").
54. See, eg., Pfizer, Inc. v. Government of India, 434 U.S. 308, 313-15 (1978). A bill is
now pending that would somewhat limit the holding in Pfizer. See note 75 infra.
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ernments that restrict international trade. 55 The economic justifications for pursuing international antitrust violators as doggedly as
domestic violators are in some respects uncertain. 56 The Supreme
Court nonetheless has emphasized unequivocally the importance of
vigorous international enforcement: "If . . . potential antitrust violators must take into account the full costs of their conduct, American consumers are benefited by the maximum deterrent effect of
treble damages upon all potential violators." 57 The Court, in other
words, has accepted the view that restricted enforcement "would not
only fail to promote the economic goals furthered by the antitrust
laws, but . . . would run contrary to them and could have an overall
detrimental impact upon the domestic American economy." 58
Whatever the legislative history of the Clayton and Sherman Acts
may have been,59 vigorous international enforcement has become an
established component of American antitrust law.60
In addition to reducing the effectiveness of antitrust enforcement,
the PTIA will undermine its fairness. The specific role of such traditional jurisprudential notions as "equity, fair play, and justice"61 in
antitrust litigation remains unsettled,62 but most commentators agree
SS. See Industrial Inv. Dev. Corp. v. Mitsui & Co., 594 F.2d 48, SS-S6 (5th Cir. 1979), cert.
denied, 44S U.S. 903 (1980).
S6. See note SI supra. See generally Seki, The Justice JJepartmenl's New Antitrust Guldefor
International Operations-A Summary and Evaluation, 32 Bus. LAW. 1633, 1637 (1977) (''This
[enforcement policy], of course, assumes that the same economic policy considerations which
caused the courts to condemn these practices as illegal per se in their domestic counterparts
will also be found to be present in the international sphere.").
57. Pfizer, Inc. v. Government of India, 434 U.S. 308, 31S (1978) (emphasis added). A
proposed bill that would limit the holding in Pfizer, S. 816, in no way affects the ideas expressed in the quoted statement. See SENATE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, THE ANTITRUST
RECIPROCITY ACT OF 1981, S. REP. No. 97-78, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 8-9 (1981) (''The argument, therefore, that S. 816 would seriously diminish the deterrent value of treble damage
actions simply is not convincing.").
S8. Velvel, Antitrust Suits by Foreign Nations, 2S CATH. U. L. REV. 1, 7 (197S), cited in
Pfizer, Inc. v. Government of India, 434 U.S. 308, 31S n.14 (1978).
S9. See 1 J. ATWOOD & K. BREWSTER,supra note 2, at§ 2.03 (describing elusive legislative
intent of the Sherman Act Congress).
60. See note S2 supra. Cf. Timken Roller Bearing Co. v. United States, 341 U.S. S93, S99
(1951) (acceptance of view contrary to Alcoa opinion "would make the Sherman Act a dead
letter insofar as it prohibits contracts and conspiracies in restraint of foreign trade").
61. Corbin v. Corbin, 26 Conn. Supp. 443, 4S0, 226 A.2d 799, 803 (Super. Ct. 1967) (recognizing in divorce proceedings anti-suit injunction issued by West Virginia court).
62. In Texas Indus., Inc. v. Radcliff Materials, Inc., 101 S. Ct. 2061 (1981), the Supreme
Court held that antitrust defendants have no right to contribution from fellow violators because there are no grounds in federal statutory or common law upon which federal courts may
recognize such a claim. The Court declined to evaluate the policy issues, including fairness,
that the contribution question raises. 101 S. Ct. at 2070. But cf. 101 S. Ct. at 2064 (contribution's proponents "presuppose a legislative intent to allow parties violating the law to draw
upon equitable principles to mitigate the consequences of their wrongdoing. . . • Traditional
equitable standards have something to say about the septic state of the hands of such a suitor
in the courts."). Since the refusal to recognize claims for contribution was based on the absence of a proper foundation for the right of action, Texas Industries says nothing about the
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that fairness is an essential consideration. 63 An analysis of the several types of relationships affected by the Act reveals that it may
introduce a number of distinct inequities.
The PTIA has its most marked effect on negotiations in cases
involving only one defendant and one plaintiff. On the one hand,
the shift in bargaining power engendered by the Act may itself be
unfair because the amount of the settlement will tum not on the merits of the case, but on whether the plaintiff has vulnerable assets in
Britain. 64 On the other hand, some claims may be frivolous, 65 and
eliminating the coercive threat of treble damages may promote fairer
settlements. There is obviously no guarantee that the Act will affect
only frivolous claims. Depending upon one's point of view, the
smaller settlements in cases involving only one plaintiff and one defendant may be either unfair or merely more "realistic."66 It only
remains certain that the PTIA will effect a transfer of wealth from
plaintiffs to defendants that is completely unrelated to any American
law or policy.
That the PTIA will in fact introduce new inequities into antitrust
settlements can also be seen by considering cases involving multiple
plaintiffs and defendants. An American plaintiff possessing vulnerable assets in Great Britain will be forced to settle earlier and for less
money than its more fortunate co-plaintiffs. The unfairness of this
situation remains difficult to assess, 67 but it is clear that the settlements will be unrelated to the relative merits of the plaintiffs' cases.
The Act's effect is even more pronounced from the defendants' perspective. Because defendants who combine to violate the antitrust
laws are jointly and severally liable for all damages sustained,68
importance of fairness in an equitable proceeding instituted by a prevailing American plaintiff
to protect a treble damages recovery.
63. See, e.g., Ponsoldt & Terry, Contribution in Civil Antitrust Litigation: The Emerging
Consensus in Legal Literature, 38 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 315, 341-42 (1981) (finding that most,
though not all, commentators favor some sort of contribution); Rose, Contribution in Antitrust:
Some Policy Considerations, 48 ANTITRUST L.J. 1605, 1609 (1980) (''The basic argument in
support of contribution is that it is unfair and inequitable to require a joint wrongdoer to pay
more than its fair share of liability."); Note, Contribution and Antitrust Policy, 78 MrcH. L.
REv. 890, 903-10 (1980). But cf. Easterbrook, Landes & Posner, Contribution Among Antitrust
.Defendants: A Legal and Economic Analysis, 23 J.L. & EcoN. 331, 337-44 (1980) ("[T]he case
for a contribution rule as a means of preventing unfairness is unpersuasive.").
64. See note 16 supra and accompanying text. Removing all assets from Britain is probably not a realistic alternative for persons doing business there.
65. See K. ELZINGA & w. BREIT, supra note 35, at 90-95; R. POSNER, supra note 27, at 228;
Austin, Negative Effects of Treble .Damage Actions: Reflections on the New Antitrust Strategy,
1978 DUKE LJ. 1353.
66. See note 23 supra and accompanying text.
67. The simplest kind of litigation would only involve plaintiffs with equally meritorious
cases; however, in actual practice, the merits of co-plaintiffs' cases may vary considerably.
68. See Perma Life Mufflers, Inc. v. International Parts Corp., 392 U.S. 134, 144 (1968)
(White, J., concurring); Wilson P. Abraham Constr. Corp. v. Texas Indus., Inc., 604 F.2d 897,
904 n.15 (5th Cir. 1979), ajfd sub nom. Texas Indus., Inc. v. Radcliff Materials, Inc., IOI S. Ct.
2061 (1981).
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plaintiffs need not sue all violators, but may choose which of the
conspirators they will name as defendants. 69 Defendants so selected
are not entitled to contribution from their PTIA-shielded co-conspirators;70 similarly, litigating defendants' liabilities are not reduced by
the shares of damages attributable to settling defendants. 71 These
aspects of American law often lead to unfair results, 72 but the PTIA
will increase that unfairness in two ways. First, astute American
plaintiffs will simply not sue British defendants, and will choose instead to recover their entire loss from defendants who cannot institute clawback suits; second, even if British conspirators are sued, the
lower settlements that the Act enables them to negotiate will leave
their co-defendants liable for the lion's share of the plaintiffs' damages. This result would seem especially unfair if the British conspirator were more culpable than its American counterpart, or if the
American defendant had unintentionally violated the law.73
By altering the relationships among actual litigants in antitrust
cases, the PTIA alters the relationships among potential litigants,
and gives British companies a competitive advantage. British companies doing business in this country now enjoy a lower risk of being
named defendants in private antitrust suits and thus are freer to engage in anticompetitive practices than their competitors from other
nations. The likely reaction of other countries to Britain's competitive edge - enacting their own clawback legislation74 - would both
undermine American enforcement efforts and place domestic companies at a competitive disadvantage. In this respect, the Act clashes
with basic notions of fairness in international commercial practices,
which call for the creation of "conditions throughout the world in
which the enterprises of all countries can compete on essentially the
same terms." 75
Execution upon a judgment under the PTIA also undermines an
69. Wilson P. Abraham Constr. Corp. v. Texas Indus., Inc., 604 F.2d 897, 899 n.3 (5th Cir.
1979), qffd sub nom. Texas Indus., Inc. v. Radcliff Materials, Inc., 101 S. Ct. 2061 (1981);
Walker Distrib. Co. v. Lucky Lager Brewing Co., 323 F.2d 1, 8 (9th Cir. 1963).
70. Texas Indus., Inc. v. Radcliff Materials, Inc., 101 S. Ct. 2061, 2070 (1981).
71. See Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 401 U.S. 321, 344 (1971); Note,
supra note 63, at 907.
72. See, e.g., Olson Farms, Inc. v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 649 F.2d 1370 (1979), qffd en bane,
percuriam, 649 F.2d 1382 (10th Cir. 1981) (defendant held liable for 24 times its pro-rata share
of damages). Many commentators have noted the unfairness of such results. See, e.g., Kirkham, Complex Civil Litigation-Have Good Intentions Gone Awry?, 70 F.R.D. 199, 207 (1976);
Note, supra note 63, 903-10.
73. Cf. Note, supra note 63, at 903-10 (discussing unfairness of denying contribution).
74. The British have attempted to encourage this response. See Protection of Trading In•
terests Act, 1980, c. 11, § 7 (reciprocal enforcement rights for citizens of countries that enact
similar clawback legislation).
75. SENATE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, THE ANTITRUST RECIPROCITY ACT OF 1981, S.
REP. No. 97-78, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 14 (1981) (report on S. 816, which would reverse Pfizer v.
Government of India, 434 U.S. 308 (1978)) (quoting remarks of Senator Adlai Stevenson).
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American court's authority to issue a judgment for treble damages.
Since the clawback suit attacks only the parties to the litigation and
not the American court itself, the jurisdiction of the American court
and the propriety of its application of American law remain technically unchallenged.76 But an American court charged with furthering Congress's antitrust policies may surely look to the substance
and not the form of the British suit. American policies should prevail. In attacking the antitrust policies that an American court is
duty bound to uphold, a clawback suit has the practical effect of diminishing that court's authority. The syllogistic niceties of equity
jurisprudence should yield in an American court to the practical necessity of protecting the court's final judgment for treble damages.
Some form of relief thus seems appropriate.77 Part II discusses
the propriety of one type of relief - an antisuit injunction barring
British defendants from resorting to the PTIA. An antisuit injunction could nullify, at least in part, the effects of the PTIA. Actual
injunctions, in theory, could preserve both treble damage awards
and the authority of American courts. And the availability of injunctive relief would put British defendants on notice that they could
not securely rely upon the Act's protection. The possibility of an
antisuit injunction, unfortunately, would further complicate antitrust
litigation, but in a way that would favor plaintiffs by at least partially
ameliorating the effect of a threatened clawback suit.78 Similarly,
the enforcement scheme associated with a previously issued antisuit
injunction79 would provide an important bargaining chip in settlement negotiations arising from PTIA litigation. In either case, by
increasing the size of settlements, the injunction should mitigate the
Act's discouraging effect on _private antitrust enforcement, and promote deterrence. Because antisuit injunctions will help ensure that
American or other foreign defendants will not have to pay for the
damages caused by British companies, the injunctions also will promote fairness. Several compelling arguments, then, favor the issuance of antisuit injunctions.
II.

THE PROPRIETY OF A TRANSNATIONAL ANTISUIT INJUNCTION

"There is little purpose to be served," according to one court, "in
discussing the legal authorities dealing with the question of the
power of a court to enjoin a party from litigating in another forum.
16. See note 82 infra and accompanying text.
11. See text following note 82 infra.

78. The antisuit injunction is an incomplete remedy because regardless of any action that
an American court may take, the PTIA, simply by virtue of its existence, means that private
antitrust suits carry greater risks of complexity, longevity, and uncertain return, see notes 32-34
supra and accompanying text, than had existed before its enactment.
19. See notes 100-08 infra and accompanying text.
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The court clearly has such power, in appropriate circumstances." 80
80. Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A. v. State of Iran, 484 F. Supp. 832, 836 (S.D.N.Y. 1980)
(dictum). See, e.g., Cole v. Cunningham, 133 U.S. 107, 118-19, 134 (1890); Bethell v, Peace,
441 F.2d 495, 498 (5th Cir. 1971); In re Unterweser Reederei, G.m.b.H., 428 F.2d 888, 890-92
(5th Cir. 1970), vacated on other grounds, 407 U.S. l (1972); Harvey Aluminum, Inc. v. American Cyanamid Co., 203 F.2d 105, 108 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 345 U.S. 964 (1953); In re Navagazione Libera Triestina, S.A., 36 F.2d 712, 714 (2d Cir. 1929); Omnium Lyonnais v. Dow
Chem. Co., 441 F. Supp. 1385, 1390 (C.D. Cal. 1977); Velsicol Chem. Corp. v. Hooker Chem.
Corp., 230 F. Supp. 998, 1017 (N.D. Ill. 1964); United Cigarette Mach. Co. v. Wright, 156 F.
244, 245-46 (C.C.E.D.N.C. 1907), '!!fd per curiam, 193 F. 1023 (4th Cir. 1912); Venizelos v.
Venizelos, 30 A.D.2d 856,856,293 N.Y.S.2d 20, 21 (App. Div. 1968); I J. HIGH, A TREATISE
ON THE LAW OF INJUNCTIONS § 103 (4th ed. 1905); 5 J. POMEROY, A TREATISE ON EQUITY
JURISPRUDENCE§ 1361(b) (5th ed. 1941); 3 J. STORY, COMMENTARIES ON EQUITY JURISPRU•
DENCE§§ 1224-25 (14th ed. 1918); Messner, The Jurisdiction ofa Court ofEquity Over Persons
to Compel the .Doing ofActs Outside the Territorial Limits ofthe State, 14 MINN, L. REV. 494,
505-06 (1930); Comment, Extraterritorial Recognition ofInjunctions Against Suit, 39 YALE L.J.
719, 719 (1930). See generally Annot., 6 A.L.R.2d 896 (1949) (interstate context).
An antisuit injunction would hardly be unprecedented. For example, courts have issued
antisuit injunctions to prevent parties before them from pursuing related, but disruptive litigation in another forum. See Bethell v. Peace, 441 F.2d 495,498 (5th Cir. 1971); Harvey Aluminum, Inc. v. American Cyanamid Co., 203 F.2d 105, 108 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 345 U.S. 964
(1953) (''We think that the district court has discretion to enjoin another action in British
Guiana on the ground of vexatiousness."). A California district court recently enjoined a
plaintiff from seeking execution in France upon French judgments because the judgments had
been obtained with documents that the California court had protected with a secrecy order.
Omnium Lyonnais v. Dow Chem. Co., 441 F. Supp. 1385 (C.D. Cal. 1977). The court noted
that it was compelled to issue the antisuit injunction to preserve the integrity of its order, to
protect its jurisdiction, and to enforce its express intent. 441 F. Supp. at 1390. Similarly, the
Fifth Circuit has upheld an injunction against suit in another forum to prevent litigation vexatious to a successful plaintiff. See Bethell v. Peace, 441 F.2d 495 (5th Cir. 1971). The court
upheld a lower court order enjoining a Florida real estate broker from seeking enforcement of
a fraud-induced sales agreement in a Bahamian court. The American court defended the injunction on the alternative grounds that, first, the defrauded land owners should be spared the
"expense and vexation" of defending a suit in a foreign jurisdiction, and second, that Florida
had an important "interest in regulating the activities of its licensed real estate brokers to
prevent them from taking advantage of those to whom they ow[e] . . . a fiduciary obligation."
441 F.2d at 498.
Support for issuing an antisuit injunction may also be drawn from opinions ordering the
performance of acts in foreign countries. See generally Note, Limitations on the Federal Judicial Power to Compel Acts Violating Foreign Law, 63 COLUM. L. REV. 1441 (1963). The easiest
cases involve injunctions that implicate no clearly articulated policy of the foreign state, see,
e.g., United States v. First Natl. City Bank, 379 U.S. 378, 384-85 (1965); closer cases involve
decrees that require the defendant to undermine the policies of the foreign country, see, e.g.,
United States v. First Natl. City Bank, 396 F.2d 897, 901-04 (2d Cir. 1968) (German banking
policies); United States v. Watchmakers of Switz. Information Center, Inc., (1963] Trade Cas.
77,414, 77,456-57 (S.D.N.Y. 1962), mod!fied, (1965] Trade Cas. 80,490 (S.D.N.Y. 1965) (Swiss
trade policies), or even to break its laws, see, e.g., Arthur Andersen & Co. v. Finesilver, 546
F.2d 338, 342 (10th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1096 (1977) ("We are not impressed by
. . . [the] contention that international comity prevents a domestic court from ordering action
which violates foreign law."). Compare In re Uranium Antitrust Litigation, 480 F. Supp. 1138
(N.D. Ill. 1979), with Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gulf Canada Ltd., 111 D.L.R.3d 74 (Can. 1980). See
generally Note, Foreign Nondisclosure Laws and .Domestic .Discovery Orders in Antitrust Litiga•
tion, 88 YALE L.J. 612 (1979). Since a British defendant enjoined from instituting proceedings
under the PTIA need violate no British law, a court facing the antisuit injunction question
need reach only the issues raised in policy-conflict cases. These cases consistently enforce
American law and policy. In the Swiss Watchmakers case, United States v. Watchmakers of
Switz. Information Center, Inc., (1963] Trade Cas. 77,414 (S.D.N.Y. 1962), mod!fied, [1965]
Trade Cas. 80,490 (S.D.N.Y. 1965), for example, the court ordered an end to a watchmakers'
cartel illegal under the American antitrust laws but clearly supported by the Swiss government.
(1963] Trade Cas. at 77,456-57. Similarly, in United States v. First Natl. City Bank, 396 F.2d
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That the court in which the litigation would occur is one of a foreign
sovereign concerns the advisability of issuing an injunction, rather
than the court's authority to do so. 81 Less clear, however, is the basis
of that authority. The traditional view is that antisuit injunctions are
appropriate because they operate against the defendant, over whom
the court has personal jurisdiction, and not against the foreign tribunal itself. 82 But this is surely a fiction. Enjoining the parties restrains the foreign court and interferes with its jurisdiction.83 The
better reasoned approach recognizes that there is no practical difference between addressing an injunction to the parties and addressing
it to the foreign court itself.
Whether an injunction is warranted in a particular case is a mat897 (2d Cir. 1968), the court ordered the defendants to produce secret German banking documents for an American antitrust investigation, even though the defendant could not comply
without violating German banking customs and incurring potential civil liability to its customers under German law. 396 F.2d at 901. The common thread running through all of these
cases is the paramount interest of the United States courts in furthering American policies
even when doing so requires the court to issue a transnational injunction.
Cases concerning choice-of-law and choice-of-forum clauses in contracts law also impliedly support a decision to issue an antisuit injunction. Courts routinely uphold these
clauses, see R. LEFLAR, AMERICAN CONFLICTS LAW§§ 52, 147 (3d ed. 1977), even when the
forum chosen is another country, see Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506 (1974); The
Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. I (1972), when the law chosen would mandate a
result opposite to that called for by American law, 407 U.S. at 8 n.8, and when the forum
chosen is a foreign arbitration panel, not a court, 417 U.S. at 508. Enforcing forum selection
clauses may require an injunction against proceedings in another forum. C.f. Dahlgren Mfg.
Co. v. Harris Corp., 399 F. Supp. 1253, 1256-57 (N.D. Tex. 1975) (injunction against foreign
suits issued by American court adjudicating international contracts dispute); United Cigarette
Mach. Co. v. Wright, 156 F. 244, 246 (C.C.E.D.N.C. 1907), qffd per curiam, 193 F. 1023 (4th
Cir. 1912) (same). Since the policies underlying the antitrust laws should be considered at least
as compelling as the public interest in the bargained-for predictability of forum selection
clauses, see generally The Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1, 9-11 (1972) (brief
history of forum-selection clauses in American law), a court could well justify enjoining the
British defendant from suing under the PTIA.
81. 11 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE§ 2942, at 374
(1973).
82. See Steelman v. All Continent Corp., 301 U.S. 278, 291 (1937). In Steelman, the Court
stressed that it was "unable to yield assent to the statement . . . that 'the restraint of a proper
party is legally tantamount to the restraint of the court itself.'" 301 U.S. at 291. The Court
made the quoted comment to explain why it was reversing the court below and upholding a
New Jersey injunction against proceedings in Pennsylvania. The Court's logic applies equally
well in transnational cases. See, eg., Velsicol Chem. Corp. v. Hooker Chem. Corp., 230 F.
Supp. 998, 1017 (N.D. Ill. 1964) (injunction against suit in Canada) (citing Cole v. Cunningham, 133 U.S. 107 (1890) (the leading domestic antisuit injunction case)). C.f. Toledo Scale
Co. v. Computing Scale Co., 261 U.S. 399,427 (1923) (domestic context) ("The proceeding in
the enjoining court is solely in personam and does not affect the power or function of the court
whose decree is in question."). But c.f. Donovan v. City of Dallas, 377 U.S. 408, 412-13 (1964)
(doctrine of federal preemption enables federal courts to prevent their proceedings from being
enjoined by state courts).
The British rule is similar. See British Nylon Spinners Ld. v. Imperial Chem. Indus. Ld.,
[1953) 1 Ch. 19, 25 (Ch. App. 1952); A. DICEY & J. MORRIS, DICEY AND MORRIS ON THE
CONFLICT OF LAWS 216-17 (9th ed. 1973).
83. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinea v. Insurance Co. of North America, 651 F.2d 877
(3d Cir. 1981); 11 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 81, § 2942, at 377-78.
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ter left to the court's discretion. 84 Injunctions are extraordinary remedies, and courts employ them sparingly. 85 This is particularly true
of transnational antisuit injunctions since "the direct effect of the
. . . court's action on the jurisdiction of a foreign sovereign requires
that such action be taken only with care and great restraint." 86
Among the circumstances that may justify such an injunction are the
need to protect the issuing court's jurisdiction and the need to prevent the frustration or circumvention of some important policy of the
forum. 87 A British defendant suing under the PTIA would frustrate
basic American policies, but a court should consider various equitable and practical considerations, and the doctrine of comity, before
deciding to enjoin those defendants from pursuing their clawback
remedy under the Act.

A. Equitable Considerations
Traditional equity doctrines continue to guide a court in determining whether to grant or deny injunctive relief. Courts generally
will issue anfisuit injunctions only if the plaintiff satisfies "the usual
equitable tests of irreparable injury and absence of an adequate remedy at law." 88 The test, no longer as important as it once was, 89 essentially amounts to a one-stage determination of whether the legal
remedies are inadequate. 90 Irreparable injury is presumed if there is
no adequate legal remedy. 91
American plaintiffs facing the prospect of a British clawback suit
would almost certainly satisfy this equitable requirement. Dis84. See Lemon v. Kurtzman, 411 U.S. 192, 200-01 (1973) ("In equity, as nowhere else,
courts eschew rigid absolutes and look tr:/ the practical realities and necessities inescapably
involved in reconciling competing interests . . . ."); Conner v. Brierley, 57 F.R.D. 144, 145
(W.D. Pa. 1972) ("Except in unusual cases, whether an injunction should issue is a decision
that rests with the sound discretion of the court."); 11 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 81,
§ 2942, at 365-70.
85. See Sharp v. Lucky, 266 F.2d 342, 343 (5th Cir. 1959) (per curiam); Progress Dev.
Corp. v. Mitchell, 182 F. Supp. 681, 711 (N.D. Ill. 1960), qffd. in part, revd. in part, 286 F.2d
222 (7th Cir. 1961).
86. Canadian Filters (Harwich) Ltd. v. Lear-Siegler, Inc., 412 F.2d 577,578 (1st Cir. 1969).

81. Cf. 11 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 81, § 2942, at 379 (discussing federal court
injunctions against state court proceedings).
88. 17 C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & E. COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE
§ 4226, at 347 (1978). See D. DOBBS, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF REMEDIES§ 2.10, at 108
(1973). Cf. Philip v. Macri, 261 F.2d 945, 947 (9th Cir. 1958) (injunction against Peruvian
proceedings denied because denial would deprive the moving party of no "equitable right");
Roberts Realty of the Bahamas, Ltd. v. Miller & Solomon (Bahamas), Ltd., 234 So. 2d 417,
418 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1970) (transnational antisuit injunction refused because "the record
presented upon this appeal is entirely devoid of a showing of irreparable injury to the
appellee").
89. See D. DOBBS, supra note 88, § 2.5, at 61.
90. See id. § 2.10, at 108.
91. Id.
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gorging two thirds of an award 92 usually will leave a plaintiff with no
effective remedy for antitrust violations: it will lose the multiplied
portion of the award provided for in section 4 of the Clayton Act. 93
An antisuit injunction often will provide the only effective means for
protecting treble damages awards. Although removing vulnerable
assets from Britain before initiating antitrust litigation is a possibility, plaintiffs pursuing this option would have to cease doing business in Britain, and perhaps in other countries as well.94 Legal
damage actions are similarly unattractive; it is difficult to develop a
theory grounded in either tort or contract that would allow a plaintiff
to recoup the lost two thirds of its award. The only judicial alternative to an antisuit injunction that readily suggests itself is a subsequent action for restitution in an American court for the money
taken in the British clawback suit.95 But even if such an action were
successful,96 it would prevent neither the disruption of the plaintiffs
business caused by the clawback suit, nor the filing of subsequent
suits by the defendant. 97 Perhaps most importantly, the uncertainty
and delay associated with these alternative legal remedies minimize
their potential equalizing role in settlement negotiations, where the
PTIA has its most pronounced effects.98 Under these circumstances,
a court reasonably could conclude that it should enjoin threatened
clawback suits. 9 9
92. Protection of Trading Interests Act, 1980, c. 11, § 6(2).
93. Clayton Act § 4, 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1976).
94. See Protection of Trading Interests Act, 1980, c. 11, § 7.
95. In the context of debtor-creditor relations, for instance, restitution is often given for
wrongful proceedings and attachments. See 2 G. PALMER, THE LAW OF RESTITUTION§§ 9.8.9 (1978); RESTATEMENT OF RESTITUTION § 73 (1937).
96-. A suit for restitution, supported by an allegation of unjust enrichment, could easily fail.
Because "unjust enrichment" has never been precisely defined, see 2 G. PALMER, supra note
95, at§ 1.1, it is not clear that an American court would conclude that a clawback suit authorized by British law would unjustly enrich the British defendant Although strong countervailing interests may induce British defendants to leave assets in the United States, it is
possible that defendants will remove themselves from the jurisdiction of American courts to
make themselves judgment-proof. An injunction could substantially reduce this possibility.
See notes 100-08 infra and accompanying text.
91. Cf. text at notes 114-18 infra (general difficulties in pursuing litigation in two competing jurisdictions).
98. See text at notes 31-36 supra.
99. Before issuing an injunction, however, the court must determine that a suit is
threatened. Courts grant injunctions only if satisfied "that there is a real danger that the act
complained of actually will take place." 11 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 81, § 2942, at
369. Although the question is primarily one of timing, the international character of the
threatened litigation gives it considerable importance. The court must decide whether it
should enjoin all British defendants, only those defendants who threaten to institute clawback
suits, or only those who actually institute such suits. The substantial benefits provided by the
Act suggest that it is not unwarranted to assume that most British defendants will take adv!llltage of the Act. But some defendants may refrain from suing under the PTIA for business
reasons. A court that waits until actions under the PTIA have been filed before enjoining the
British defendant may heighten the insult to the British courts inherent in any transnational
injunction by forcing the abandonment of cases over which the British courts have already
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B. Practical Considerations

The difficulties associated with antisuit injunctions are more
practical than legal. First, the injunctions may prove difficult to enforce. Since courts of equity historically have refused to issue unenforceable decrees, 100 a court must first determine that it can enforce
an antisuit injunction. This issue should rarely pose serious
problems. To insure compliance with its order, an American court
may sequester a British defendant's American assets, 101 or permit the
defendant instead to post an indemnity bond. 102 Because these procedures in some respects resemble an assessment of quintuple damages - treble damages for the original antitrust claim, plus two
more multiples to protect against a two-thirds clawback - a court
may choose the less draconian alternative of a simple injunction
against transferring funds or assets out of the country except in the
ordinary course ofbusiness. 103 These remedies would establish compliance with the antisuit injunction as a prerequisite to the British
defendant's participation in American markets. 104 If the defendant
defied the injunction, it could be found in contempt of court and
assumed jurisdiction. (On the other hand, by enjoining all defendants, including those who
would not have instituted clawback suits, American courts will insult their British counterparts
more frequently.)
100. See w. DE FUNIAK, HANDBOOK OF MODERN EQUITY§ 14 (2d ed. 1956) ("Where the
court has the theoretical power to grant an injunction but enforcement is impracticable or
impossible, the court will not grant the injunction. It would be derogatory to the dignity of the
court to enter orders it could not enforce."); D. DOBBS, supra note 88, § 2.12, at 132.
101. See W. DE FUNIAK, supra note 100, at§§ 10-13. In New York, for example, "[a]n
order of attachment may be granted in any action . . . where the plaintiff has demanded and
would be entitled . . . to a money judgment against one or more defendants" in order to
insure that a judgment against the defendant, if rendered, could be enforced. N.Y. C1v. PRAc.
LAW§ 6201 (McKinney 1980).
102. Bond posting procedures are controlled by state law, FED. R. C1v. P. 64, and many
states have such procedures. See 19 C.J.S. Sequestration § 16 (1952).
103. See In re Uranium Antitrust Litigation, 617 F.2d 1248, 1258-61 (7th Cir. 1980). The
injunction against transfer would have to stand for six years, the period within which the
defendant must sue under the PTIA. See Limitation Act, 1939, 2 & 3 Geo. 6, c. 21, § 2(l)(d);
PARL. DEB., H.C. STANDING COMM. F., Dec. 6, 1979, at 65 (remarks of Attorney General Sir
Michael Havers).
104. See also Engineered Sports Prods. v. Brunswick Corp., 362 F. Supp. 722, 729 (D.
Utah 1973). In this patent infringement suit against a European defendant, the court
commented:
The international aspects of this case may . . . recommend jurisdictional restraint on the
ground that to exert jurisdiction in the present circumstance could at best result in a
money judgment against the defendants which is unenforceable here because no assets are
here and dishonored in Europe as an extrajurisdictional act and a violation of comity. . . . However this ground is faulty since injunctive relief is available which, through
nationwide domestic enforcement, may protect the plaintiffs from the domestic introduction of infringing [ski] boots by the defendants or those acting in concert or participation
with them.
362 F. Supp. at 729. The injunction thus effectively bars the defendant from all American
markets while the judgment remains unpaid.
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fined. 105 The defendant would then have to pay the fine, abandon its
sequestered assets, or forfeit its bond. 106 The resulting proceeds
could be used to reimburse the American plaintiff for the money lost
in the British clawback suit. 107 An injunction against use of the
PTIA is, therefore, no less enforceable than any other injunction involving a foreign party. 10s
A second practical consideration for courts contemplating antisuit injunctions is the possibility of retaliation. The fundamental
nature of the right of access to the courts and the importance that the
British attach to the PTIA 109 heighten the possibility that some form
of judicial or diplomatic retaliation might follow the issuance of an
injunction. 110 This retaliation could take the form, for example, of a
British counterinjunction. 111 Like American courts, British courts
105. See W. DE FUNIAK, supra note 100, § 9, at 20 n.49 (citing Blackmer v. United States,
284 U.S. 421 (1932)).
106. See W. DE FUNIAK, supra note 100, at § 9.
101. See Vuitton et Fils, S.A. v. Carousel Handbags, 592 F.2d 126, 130 (2d Cir. 1979)
(compensatory damages in civil contempt proceedings to be awarded to plaintiff for defendant's violation of injunction against producing fake handbags); Parker v. United States, 153
F.2d 66, 70-71 (1st Cir. 1946) (leading case).
108. Foreign defendants may always escape the reach of a court's authority by fleeing with
their assets. See W. DEFUNIAK, supra note 100, § 9, at 20. This may not always be quickly
accomplished, of course, as in the case of real estate holdings.
109. See notes 139-44 infra and accompanying text.
I 10. In a climate of worsening trade relations, Parliament might amend the Protection of
Trading Interests Act to clawback the entire American antitrust award. The British have
threatened in so many words to enact such an amendment, which was seriously proposed while
the Bill was in committee. The amendment read in pertinent part: ''the person against whom
the judgment was given shall be able to recover the full amount of damages paid if the judgment related exclusively to matters or acts committed outside the jurisdiction of that overseas
count_ry." PARL. DEB., H.C. STANDING COMM. F., Dec. 6, 1979, at 65 (remarks of David
Crouch) (proposing amendment No. 23) (emphasis added). In tabling the amendment, John
Nott made it clear that the government might later reconsider it if the United States did not in
the meantime prove cooperative: "We did consider the question of total recovery, . . . but
decided that, at this stage anyhow, it was sensible to give a right purely for the recovery of the
penal element rather than for the compensation itself." PARL. DEB., H.C. STANDING COMM.
F, Dec. 6, 1979, at 73 (remarks of John Nott). The inference of a threat seems ineluctable:
"We hope that the American authorities will notice our reluctance and draw the conclusion
that it is for them now, in the fullness of time, after the Bill is enacted, to come forward with
their ideas on how we should proceed beyond that." 973 PARL. DEB., H.C. (5th ser.) 1591
(1979) (remarks of Under-Secretary of State for Trade Norman Tebbit). See 405 PARL. DEB.,
H.L. (5th ser.) 946 (1980) (remarks of Lord Mackay) (noting that§ 6 of the PTIA "is an effective initial attack on the problem") (emphasis added).
Parliament might then further amend the Act to take this strengthened clawback directly
from British subsidiaries of American parent corporations. Such an amendment was also actually proposed, but failed. See note 20 supra.
111. Cf. James v. Grand Trunk W.R.R., 14 Ill. 2d 356, 152 N.E.2d 858 (1958), cert. denied,
358 U.S. 915 (1958) (Illinois counterinjunction against original Michigan injunction that had
barred plaintiff from prosecuting wrongful death suit in Illinois); Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry. v.
Schendel, 292 F. 326 (8th Cir. 1923) (plaintiff sues in Minnesota state court, obeys Iowa injunction to dismiss suit, brings same suit in Minnesota federal court, and then causes federal court
to issue counterinjunction to prohibit the enforcement of the Iowa injunction); Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506,517 (1974) (court should avoid "legal no-man's-land" of jurisdictional war of injunctions); Orton v. Smith, 59 U.S. (18 How.) 263, 265-66 (1855) (court

1592

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 79:1574

have the power to enjoin parties before them from instituting proceedings in foreign courts. 112 If the Act applies, 113 the only prerequisite to a counterinjunction scenario is that both parties have
sufficient assets within the jurisdiction of the opposing court 114 to
support a series of injunctions and attachments - a war of attrition.
This possibility typically might involve the following events:
(1) The American plaintiff wins his antitrust suit, secures and executes a judgment for treble damages, and gets an injunction to
prevent the British defendant from using the PTIA;
(2) the British defendant ignores the injunction, secures and executes
a clawback judgment under the Act, and persuades the British
court to issue a counterinjunction that prohibits the American
plaintiff from instituting contempt proceedings in the United
States to enforce the original, American-issued injunction; and
(3) the American plaintiff ignores the counterinjunction, institutes
contempt proceedings, and thereby retrieves (for a while) the full
value of his treble damages award.

At this point, each party is subject to contempt proceedings and theoretically could begin a series of counterinjunctions that extends far
beyond this simple three-stage scenario.
Alternatively, an American contempt judgment itself might form
the basis for a second claw:t,ack suit. 115 Since the Act's legislative
history at every stage reveals Parliament's desire to have it read as
liberally as possible and to close all its loop-holes, 116 the difference
should "sedulously avoi[d]" the "humiliating spectacle" of jurisdictional conflict); Peck v, Jenness, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 612,625 (1849) (war of injunctions would leave parties "without remedy" and so should be avoided); State ex rel Gen. Dynamics Corp. v. Luten, 566 S.W.2d 452,
460-61 (Mo. 1978) (court should avoid starting war of injunctions because "[a]n impasse . . .
could ensue").
112. See British Nylon Spinners Ld. ~- Imperial Chem. Indus. Ld., (1953] I Ch. 19, 25 (Ch.
App. 19S2) (dictum); A. DICEY & J. MORRIS, supra note 82, at 216-20 (9th ed. 1973); P.
NORTH, CHESHIRE'S PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW 120-21 (9th ed. 1974).
In response to criticisms in Parliament, the government disposed of the difficulties that
might arise in obtaining personal jurisdiction. After the opposition severely criticized the
"subsidiary" loophole, see PARL. DEB., H.C. STANDING COMM. F, Dec. 6, 1979, at 66-69 (colloquy between Jeffrey Thomas and Attorney General Sir Michael Havers) (the "subsidiary"
loophole is discussed in notes 20-21 supra), the government added a clause, Protection of
Trading Interests Act, 1980, c. I I, § 6(5), that ''will enable the rules of court relating to the
service of process outside the jurisdiction to be used in cases coming within the [clawback]
clause," 404 PARL. DEB., H.L. (5th ser.) S63 (1980) (remarks of Lord Mackay). See 916 PARL.
DEB., H.C. (5th ser.) 1026 (1979) (remarks of John Nott). Clause 6(5) is in the nature of an
enabling provision, see PARL. DEB., H.C. STANDING COMM. F, Dec. 6, 1979, at 68 (remarks of
Attorney General Sir Michael Havers), for the necessary amendments to the British rules of
civil procedure, R. SUP. CT. 11, 1965 STAT. INST. 499S, S017-22. For the practical consequences of§ 6(5) to an American parent corporation, see note 21 supra.
113. See notes 13-21 supra and accompanying text.
114. See notes 100-08 supra and accompanying text.
11S. The PTIA defines "a judgment for multiple damages" as one "for an amount arrived
at by doubling, trebling or otherwise multiplying a sum assessed as compensation for the loss
or damage sustained by the person in whose favour the judgment is given." Protection of
Trading Interests Act, 1980, c. 11, § 5(3).
116. In amending the original Bill, Protection of Trading Interests Bill, H.C. No. 66, Oct,
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between an award for contempt and one for treble damages is not
likely to prevent a second clawback suit. 117 Still a third scenario
might involve a British suit for restitution. 118 But whatever the actual events, the jurisdictional conflict would remain.
Few would doubt that the "dicey atmosphere of such a legal noman's-land would surely damage the fabric of international commerce and trade." 119 Although no entirely satisfactory legal resolution seems possible, 120 the practical consequences of the conflict
should prove far less troublesome than the theoretical consequences.
As the dispute moves from one stage to the next in the scenario, the
need for compromise and restraint would become clear. The parties'
resolve to carry on the litigation would break as soon as they realized
that a settlement offered the only realistic chance of ending the dispute.121 Thus, a court may properly ignore the chimerical counterinjunction scenario, and issue an antisuit injunction.
C. Comity
A judicial determination that an antisuit injunction would serve
compelling American interests, could easily be enforced, and would
not provoke substantial retaliation does not necessarily end the matter. A court also may refuse an injunction on the ground that the
principle of comity between nations 122 advises against its issuance.
31, 1979, Parliament closed several possible loopholes. After several of the Lords noted in
committee that assignees of claims for multiple damages might fall outside the purview of the
statute, see, e.g., 404 PARL. DEB., H.L. (5th ser.) 1541 (1980) (remarks of Lord Hacking), § 6(6)
was added on _amendment. See Protection of Trading Interests Act, 1980, c. 11, § 6(6); 980
PARL. DEB., H.C. (5th ser.) 1107 (1980) (remarks of John Nott). Other additions cover payees
of claims for contribution between codefendants, Protection of Trading Interests Act, 1980,
c. 11, § 6(7), and recipients of payments ordered by any "tribunal or authority," whether judicial or administrative, Protection of Trading Interests Act, 1980, c. 11, § 6(7); however, the
Supreme Court's refusal to recognize claims for contribution in antitrust litigation, see Texas
Indus., Inc. v. Radcliff Materials, Inc., IOI S. Ct. 2061 (1981), renders the former provision
vestigial.
117. It would appear that the second clawback suit would be for two thirds of the full
treble damages award rather than for two thirds of the two thirds recovered in the American
contempt proceedings. See note 115 supra.
118. q: 17 liALsBURY'S LAWS OF ENGLAND ~ 461, at 277-78 (4th ed. 1976) (restitution
normally given in British courts after wrongful or irregular execution).
119. Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506, 517 (1974) (avoiding specter of dual litigation where parties had chosen foreign forum).
120. See 2 J. ATWOOD & K. BREWSTER, supra note 2, § 19.01, at 343-44 (suggesting that
there is no answer); R. FALK, THE ROLE OF DOMESTIC COURTS IN THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL ORDER, 32-37 (1964) (same); R. LEFLAR, supra note 80, at§ 53 (same). q: Note, Restriction of Venue in Transitory Causes ofAction, 54 Nw. U. L. REv. 75 (1959) (suggesting solutions
to the counterinjunction problem in domestic context).
121. Antitrust litigants commonly settle out of court, whatever the merits of their cases,
when corporate survival leaves them no other choice. See Note, supra note 63, at 906-08.
122. Comity defies precise definition. It amounts to little more than "a blend of courtesy
and expedience," Canadian Filters (Harwich) Ltd. v. Lear-Siegler, Inc., 412 F.2d 577, 578 (1st
Cir. 1969), and expresses not so much a hard-and-fast rule as a general philosophy of "good
sense, mutual respect and forebearance." Willoughby, Remarks by an English Solicitor, in
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Although it has been said that comity is "a general mode of expression that at most expresses an attitude or disposition and on analysis
is simply circular," 123 American courts have often used the term to
express a willingness to exercise "care and restraint" 124 in cases that
touch upon the sovereignty of a foreign power. "Comity" itself has
no precise meaning. 125 Rather, the doctrine takes on whatever shape
the exigencies of the moment require.1 26 Indeed, courts and commentators have not agreed whether comity applies as part of the antitrust jurisdiction test, 127 or operates like an abstention doctrine at
some later stage of the litigation. 128 Those who argue for the jurisdictional theory seem to have the stronger case, 129 but resolution of
the controversy is unnecessary: a court deciding whether to grant a
plaintiffs plea for an injunction clearly has the equitable power to
deny the request. 130 No statutory imperative absolutely requires a
court to issue an injunction. Despite the uncertainties concerning its
scope, comity does provide courts with a ready-made frame of referPERSPECTIVES, supra note 23, at 56, 63. Since it is "neither a matter of absolute obligation, on
the one hand, nor of mere courtesy and good will, upon the other," Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S.
113, 163-64 (1895) (recognition of French judgment in the United States), the courts are afforded considerable latitude in applying it. See generally Comment, Ordering Production of
J)ocumentsftom Abroad in Violation of Foreign Law, 31 U. Cm. L. REV. 791, 794-96 (1964)
(general background and origin of the doctrine of comity in common-law jurisprudence).
123. von Mehren & Trautman, Recognition of Foreign Adjudications: A Survey and a Suggested Approach, 81 HARV. L. REV. 1601, 1603 (1968).
124. Canadian Filters (Harwich) Ltd. v. Lear-Siegler, Inc., 412 F.2d 577, 578 (1st Cir.
1969).
125. See L. HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE CONSTITUTION 454 n.37 (1972);
Akehurst, Jurisdiction in International Law, 46 BRIT. Y.B. INT. L. 145, 214-16 (1975). See note
l22supra.
126. Compare Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of America, 549 F.2d 597, 613-14 (9th Cir.
1976) (comity takes form of seven-factor test, analogous to approach in "the field of conflict of
laws"), with Dahlgren Mfg. Co. v. Harris Corp., 399 F. Supp. 1253, 1257 (N.D. Tex. 1975) (if
case concerns only "the in personam jurisdiction of the Uruted States Courts over American
nationals" then "consideration[s] of comity" do not apply), and Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113,
163-64 (1895) (recognition of French judgment in United States courts depends upon doctrine
of comity).
127. See Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of America, 549 F.2d 597, 613-14 (9th Cir.
1976); Case Comment, 4 SUFFOLK TRANSNATL. L.J. 185, 196-97 (1980); Case Nole, 2 Nw. J.
INTL. L. & Bus. 241, 259 (1980).
128. See Mannington Mills, Inc. v. Congoleum Corp., 595 F.2d 1287, 1294-98 (3d Cir.
1979) (court must first determine that it has jurisdiction; it then determines whether comity
should apply); Zenith Radio Corp. v. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., 494 F. Supp. 1161, 1188-89
(E.D. Pa. 1980) (following two-stage test adopted in Mannington). q. Dominicus Americana
Bohio v. Gulf & Western Indus., Inc., 473 F. Supp. 680, 688 (S.D.N.Y. 1979) ("Regardless of
whether considerations of international comity are reviewed as part of the threshold decision
or in connection with a subsequent determination regarding abstention, the record in the case
at bar is insufficient for a thorough review of all the relevant factors.").
129. See Case Comment, supra note 127; Case Note, supra note 127.
130. See, e.g., The Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1 (1972) (plaintiff's plea for a
transnational antisuit injunction refused); Phillip v. Macri, 261 F.2d 945 (9th Cir. 1958) (injunction against suit in Peru refused). Note, however, that the same equitable discretion would
arguably not obtain in a Mannington Mills situation, where the court is called upon to interpret
the jurisdictional provisions of a specific statute.
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ence for deciding a novel question in international law: Should an
American court indirectly, but nonetheless clearly, challenge the decision of a foreign legislature to make successful litigation under
American law a tort? 13 1
1.

The Just!ftcations for Using a Comity Analysis

The essence of comity is judicial self-restraint. Maintenance of
international order depends upon at least a show of respect for the
legitimate concerns of other nations. 132 The principal justification
for this judicial restraint is that an antisuit injunction "represents a
challenge, albeit an indirect one, to the dignity and authority of [the
foreign] tribunal." 133 It cannot be doubted that British courts would
consider themselves "challenged" by an injunction against proceedings brought under the PTIA. The leading British case holds that
such an injunction would in effect "require that our [British] courts
should not exercise the jurisdiction which they have and which it is
their duty to exercise in regard to . . . statutory rights belonging to
an English national." 134 Even the traditional fiction that an injunction operates against the parties and not against the British courts,
though perhaps still technically correct on both sides of the Atlantic, 135 cannot conceal the fact that it deprives the enjoined parties of
"access to the courts of their own country." 13 6
A second, more tenuous justification for restraint is based on the
respect that the courts of one nation often accord the legitimate pub131. The cause of action resists categorization. One Member of Parliament referred to it as
''this new, strange but nevertheless legitimate form of clawback." 976 PARL. DEB., H.C. (5th
ser.) 1028 (1979) (remarks of Charles Fletcher-Cooke); PARL. DEB., H.C. STANDING COMM.
F., Dec. 6, 1979, at 65 (remarks of Fletcher-Cooke, Jeffrey Thomas, and Attorney General Sir
Michael Havers).
132. See Birenbaum & Johnson, U.S. Law Under Fire, N.Y. Times, Nov. 26, 1980, at 21,
col. I; Hermann, Sanctions, subsidiaries and the long arm of U.S. justice, Financial Times
(London), May 6, 1980, at 13, col. I. Less polemical works exist, written in the same vein. See
2 J. ATWOOD & K. BREWSTER, supra note 2, § 19, at 343-55; R. FALK, supra note 120, at 32-37.
133. Arpels v. Arpels, 8 N.Y.2d 339, 341, 170 N.E.2d 670, 671, 207 N.Y.S.2d 663, 665
(1960) (refusal to enjoin party from pursuing divorce action in French courts). See Canadian
Filters (Harwich) Ltd. v. Lear-Siegler, Inc., 412 F.2d 577,578 (1st Cir. 1969) (''The issue is not
one of jurisdiction, but one, almost as important when a foreign sovereign is involved, of
comity."); Roberts Realty of the Bahamas, Ltd. v. Miller & Solomon (Bahamas), Ltd., 234 So.
2d 417, 418 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1970) (''But the circuit court's injunction directly affects the
jurisdiction of a foreign sovereign . . . .").
134. British Nylon Spinners Ld. v. Imperial Chem. Indus. Ld., [1953] I Ch. 19, 26 (Ch.
App. 1952). This famous case involved an American court's attempt to strike down the rights
of a corporation in a British patent. See note 2 supra.
135. See British Nylon Spinners Ld. v. Imperial Chem. Indus. Ld., [1953] I Ch. 19, 25 (Ch.
App. 1952) (British rule); text at note 82 supra (American Rule).
136. Roberts Realty of the Bahamas, Ltd. v. Miller & Solomon (Bahamas), Ltd., 234 So.
2d 417,418 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1970). See Canadian Filters (Harwich) Ltd. v. Lear-Siegler,
Inc., 412 F.2d 577, 578 (1st Cir. 1969) (court expresses need for "a self-imposed reluctance to
interfere with courts of foreign countries").
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lie policies of another. 137 The British have a fundamental interest in
protecting the integrity of the PTIA. The British government introduced the Bill 138 because the variegated diplomatic demarches of the
last "several decades" have failed to resolve Great Britain's concern
over extraterritorial antitrust enforcement. 139 A recent antitrust case
threatens the orderly regulation of the British shipping industry. 140
Another case, now settled, threatened to destroy an important British
mining conglomerate, Rio Tinto Zinc. 141 Although the British naturally object in principle to the punitive aspects of treble damages, 142
their main objection is more practical. Extraterritorial enforcement
achieves "the maximum beneficial regulation of . . . [the United
States'] own economic environment" 143 at the direct expense of the
British economy. 144
Still a third justification for exercising judicial restraint may be
137. See, e.g., United States v. First Natl. City Bank, 396 F.2d 897, 901-03 (2d Cir. 1968).
But see Arthur Andersen & Co. v. Finesilver, 546 F.2d 338, 342 (10th Cir. 1976), cert. denied,
429 U.S. 1096 (1977) ("Foreign law may not control local law. It cannot invalidate an order
which local law authorizes.").
138. Protection of Trading Interests Bill, H.C. No. 66, Oct. 31, 1979.
139. 973 PARL. DEB., H.C. (5th ser.) 1533 (1979) (remarks of John Nott).
140. See United States v. Atlantic Container Line, Ltd., [1970-1979 Transfer Binder]
TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) ~ 45,079, at 53,764 (D.D.C. June l, 1979). The case was a criminal
action, but private parties began filing follow-up claims almost immediately. See l J.
ATWOOD & K. BREWSTER, supra note 2, § 3.26, at 77 n.118; UK moves to counter U.S. laws,
Financial Times (London), Nov. I, 1979, at 20, col. l (34 private suits already filed). The
British government specifically noted the importance of the case during its defense of the PTIA
in Parliament. See 973 PARL. DEB., H.C. (5th ser.) 1538 (1979) (remarks of John Nott).
141. See In re Uranium Antitrust Litigation, 473 F. Supp. 382 (N.D. Ill. 1979), ajfd., 617
F.2d 1248 (7th Cir. 1980); 973 PARL. DEB. H.C. (5th ser.) 1540 (1979) (remarks of John Nott)
(giving the reasons for the introduction of the PTIA in Parliament). It had been widely reported in Great Britain that the total award against the defendants in the Uranium case could
have theoretically reached $6 billion. See 404 PARL. DEB., H.L. (5th ser.) 566 (1980) (remarks
of Lord Elwyn-Jones); The Daily Telegraph (London), Nov. l, 1979, at 21, col. 3. The British
press had similarly reported that Rio Tinto Zinc, the principal British defendant in the Uranium case, could be "[t]he major beneficiary from the new" PTIA. See Dunn, Britain Fights
US "Legal Hi-jacking," The Sunday Telegraph (London), Nov. 11, 1979, at 23, col. 2. Only a
timely settlement prevented what could have been a disastrously large damages award. See
Westinghouse's Suit on Uranium Settled, N.Y. Times, Mar. 18, 1981, at 21, col. S; Westinghouse, TM1. Settle More Uranium Suits, Wall St. J., Mar. 18, 1981, at 7, col. I.
142. See 976 PARL. DEB., H.C. (5th ser.) 1034-35 (1979) (remarks of John Nott) (giving the
views of the government on the proposed Bill).
143. 973 PARL. DEB., H.C. (5th ser.) 1541 (1979) (remarks of John Nott).
144. The British feel that antitrust enforcement against the shipping conferences would
result in "excess tonnage and higher costs" that would seriously damage the industry, see
[1980] ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) No. 969, June 19, 1980, at A-6, A-8, which is
particularly "important to the United Kingdom economy," PARL. DEB., H.C. STANDING
COMM. F, Dec. 4, 1979, at 17 (remarks of John Nott). The Government's spokesman in the
House of Lords noted that Rio Tinto Zinc and the shipping concerns were "companies vital in
our trading structure." 404 PARL. DEB., H.L. (5th ser.) 559 (1980) (remarks of Lord Mackay).
The members further discussed the effect that the Act would have on British Petroleum's
worldwide operations, PARL. DEB., H.C. STANDING COMM. F, Dec. 6, 1979, at 49-53 (colloquy
between Eric Ogden & John Nott).
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found in the separation of powers doctrine. 145 The foreign relations
of the United States are "committed by the Constitution to the Executive and Legislative ... Departments." 146 The separation of powers doctrine was the Second Circuit's justification for extensively
considering West Germany's policies on bank secrecy in United
States v. First National City Bank, 147 which involved a subpoena for
German banking records in an American antitrust case. Although
the court eventually issued the production order, it plainly felt that it
would have been unwise to do so without an opinion that went considerably beyond a simple assertion of raw power. 148
There are, in sum, at least three basic arguments upon which a
court might plausibly rely in deciding to exercise judicial restraint:
respect for the jurisdiction of the British courts, respect for British
economic and trade policies, and concern for the separation of powers between the executive and the judiciary. Each is superficially
appealing. Each also, however, is ultimately unpersuasive. The theoretical justifications for not issuing a transnational antisuit injunction are weak, and the practical difficulties, surmountable.

Why the Comity Approach Must Inevitably Fail
Although interference with a foreign court's jurisdiction counsels
restraint, it has never absolutely barred American courts from issuing antisuit injunctions. 149 A court that used a comity analysis,
therefore, would balance "the individual interests and policies" of
Great Britain against "our nation's legitimate interest in regulating
anticompetitive activity." 150 Before undertaking this balancing process, the court should determine what it must weigh against American interests. Comity does not demand deference to, or even
consideration of every foreign interest. For example, American
2.

145. Cf. Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of America, 549 F.2d 597, 612 (9th Cir. 1976)
(congressional power to regulate foreign commerce limited by "respect for the role of the executive" in foreign affairs); B. HAWK, UNITED STATES, COMMON MARKET AND INTERNATIONAL
ANTITRUST 120 (1979) (discussing act-of-state doctrine). See generally L. HENKIN, supra note
125, at 205-24.
146. Oetjen v. Central Leather Co., 246 U.S. 297, 302 (1918).
147. 396 F.2d 897 (2d Cir. 1968).
148. 396 F.2d at 900-01. Compare In re Uranium Antitrust Litigation, 480 F. Supp. 1138
(N.D. Ill. 1979), qffd, 617 F.2d 1248 (7th Cir. 1980) (express refusal to apply comity in case
involving the discovery of documents located in Canada), with Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gulf Canada
Ltd., 111 D.L.R.3d 74, 86 (Can. 1980) (noncompliance with the American request and implementation of a Canadian nondisclosure law is "an assertion of Canadian sovereignty to resist
the extraterritorial application of United States anti-trust laws.").
149. See notes 80-82 supra and accompanying text.
150. Mannington Mills, Inc. v. Congoleum Corp., 595 F.2d 1287, 1298 (3d Cir. 1979). Accord, In re Uranium Antitrust Litigation, 617 F.2d 1248, 1255 (7th Cir. 1980); Timberlane
Lumber Co. v. Bank of America, 549 F.2d 597, 613 (9th Cir. 1976); Zenith Radio Corp. v.
Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., 494 F. Supp. 1161, 1178-79 (E.D. Pa. 1980); Dominicus Americana Bohio v. Gulf & W. Indus., Inc., 473 F. Supp. 680, 687-88 (S.D.N.Y. 1979).
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courts often disregard foreign statutes or policies that transgress intemational law.151 They should similarly be unwilling to defer to
foreign legislation that itself violates basic principles of comity. Although the mere fact that American and foreign interests are incompatible does :µot justify disregarding the foreign interests, comity
does not require deference to a foreign statute enacted solely to reverse what an American court has already done. 152
The PTIA is such a statute. 153 The Act not only directs British
courts to refuse to enforce certain American antitrust judgments, 154
but also requires them, in effect, to reverse American courts' treble
damage awards in clawback suits. 155 Moreover, the Act applies to
many classes of cases that do not violate British sovereignty or jurisdiction.156 The Act thus may constitute "an unprecedented offense
against those principles of comity . . . that urge respect for the operations of foreign courts." 157 The Act's anti-American intent makes
balancing British and American interests before issuing an injunction inappropriate. At that stage, there is no way to strike a balance
151. See Banco,Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 441 (1964) (White, J,, dissenting) ("I do not believe that the act of state doctrine, as judicially fashoned in this court,
and the reasons underlying it, require American courts to decide cases in disregard of international law and of the rights of litigants to a full determination on the merits."); W. BISHOP, JR,,
INTERNATIONAL LAW 78-82, 898, 898 n.179 (3d ed. 1971); Morgenstern, Recognition and Enfarcemenl ofForeign Legislative, Administrative and Judicial Acts Which Are Contrary lo International Law, 4 INTL. L.Q. 326, 343 (1951) ("There is nothing revolutionary in the suggestion
that municipal courts may . . . exclude foreign law on the ground that it is contrary to public
international law."). q: Republic oflraq v. First National City Bank, 353 F.2d 47, 51 (2d Cir,
1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 1027 (1966) (Friendly, J.) (foreign ordinance confiscating property
without compensation and in a manner contrary to forum court's public policy and shocking
to its sense of justice will not be honored).
152. Cf. Somportex Ltd. v. Philadelphia Chewing Gum Corp. 453 F.2d 435, 440 (3d Cir,
1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 1017 (1972) ("Comity should be withheld only when its acceptance would be contrary or prejudicial to the interest of the nation called upon to give it effect.").
In the context of recognizing foreign judgments, Willis Reese has suggested:
American and English courts most certainly do not make a practice of discriminating in
favor of their nationals and against foreign litigants. But they would hardly enforce without question a judgment where there was substantial reason to believe that one of their
nationals had been the victim of serious prejudice at the hands of the foreign court. And a
similar fate might well befall a judgment rendered either in contemptuous disregard of the
forum's law or contrary to its public policy.
Reese, The Sia/us in this Country of Judgments RenderedAbroad, SO COLUM, L. REV, 783, 785
(1950) (footnotes omitted).
153. The Act's primary purpose is to undermine the effectiveness of American antitrust
enforcement. 973 PARL. DEB., H.C. (5th ser.) 1533-46 (1979) (remarks of John Nott).
154. Protection of Trading Interests Act, 1980, c. 11, § S.
155. Protection of Trading Interests Act, 1980, c. 11, § 6.
156. See Danaher, supra note I, at 962 n.101.
157. Danaher, supra note 1, at 961 (1980). Danaher also argues that the Act may violate
international law. Id He admits that "international law and comity encourage, but do not
require, the enforcement of foreign judgments," id at 961 n.98, but argues nevertheless that
the Act goes so far to undo what American courts have done that it may violate "customary
international law." He offers no precedent for his position, however, and the argument appears to overstate the case against the Act.
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between each nation's interests; a court that grants an enforceable
injunction asserts the primacy of American policy, while one that
refuses to enjoin British defendants may virtually eliminate private
antitrust enforcement against those protected by the PTIA. 158 But
there is an important difference between the two courses of action.
Although denying an injunction allows British interests to prevail,
granting one will lead to accommodation of both nations' interests in
the vast majority of settled antitrust cases. British defendants would
not go entirely unpunished, but neither would they be subjected to
the full weight of the treble damages threat. At the same time,
American plaintiffs would receive more than their actual damages,
but would be forced to consider the possibility of British retaliation
when negotiating settlements. Because the injunction would not
fully offset the value of the PTIA as a negotiating tool, 159 actual settlements should move to a level somewhere between the points that
each nation would consider most appropriate.
Even if a court decided that it should attempt to balance American and British interests before enjoining British defendants, a
number of objections remain. First, the court may not be wellequipped to balance the competing interests. After deciding which
foreign interests it should consider, the court would have to assess
the weight that each country assigned to its policies. 16 For example,
the jurisdictional version of the comity test developed in Mannington
Mills v. Congoleum Corp. 161 and Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of
America 162 requires the court to consider the "[d]egree of conflict" of
American law "with foreign law or policy." 163 Whatever the value
of this approach to the question of whether a court should assume
jurisdiction, 164 it cannot succeed here. The PTIA was enacted solely
to undermine the effectiveness of the American antitrust laws. 165

°

158. See text at notes 31-47 supra.
159. See text at notes 113-21 supra.
160. An extreme instance of this sort of balancing might involve weighing the policy considerations that attach to each part of the antitrust laws. Under this approach, a court would
be less deferential in cases involving horizontal price fixing, see, e.g., United States v. SoconyVacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150,223 (1940) (horizontal price fixing per se illegal), than it would
be in cases involving only vertical nonprice restraints, see, e.g., Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE
Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 58 (1977) (overruling United States v. Arnold Schwinn & Co., 388
U.S. 365 (1969)) (vertical nonprice restraints no longer per se illegal). See 1 J. ATWOOD & K.
BREWSTER, supra note 2, § 7.20, at 205-07 (resale price maintenance and tying in foreign commerce far less harmful to the United States economy than in interstate commerce).
161. 595 F.2d 1287 (3d Cir. 1979).
162. 549 F.2d 597 (9th Cir. 1976).
163. 595 F.2d at 1297.
164. See 2 J. ATWOOD & K. BREWSTER, supra note 2, § 14.19, at 203-06 ("Whether one is
impressed with this [comity] response probably depends on how broadly one reads the comity
mandate of Timberlane, and on one's confidence in the court's ability to handle that role.");
note 195 i'!fra.
165. See note 153 supra.
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Balancing the two is therefore impossible. In In re Uranium Antitrust
Litigation, 166 when confronted with a similar problem involving a
Canadian nondisclosure law promulgated specifically to block
American pretrial discovery procedures, 167 Judge Marshall remarked: "The competing interests here display an irreconcilable
conflict on precisely the same plane of national policy. . . . It is
simply impossible to judicially 'balance' these totally contradictory
and mutually negating actions." 168 Similarly, balancing British interests in the PTIA against those of the United States in its antitrust
laws could amount to little more than a shallow attempt to clothe
with a mantle of legitimacy what would essentially amount to a judicial repeal of section 4 of the Clayton Act in foreign commerce
cases. 169 A balancing test, in other words, becomes meaningless
when a foreign power has enacted a law with the single purpose of
destroying the effectiveness of a law that an American court is duty
bound to uphold.17°
Closely related to the analytic difficulty in balancing the unbalanceable is a practical difficulty: even a successfully applied comity analysis would serve no useful purpose. A conscientious and
articulate application ·or a comity analysis to a potential PTIA case
could easily produce a result just as unacceptable to Great Britain as
an opinion based upon nothing more than the court's flat assertion of
its power to issue an injunction. 171 An American court naturally will
166. 480 F. Supp. 1138 (N.D. Ill. 1979).
167. See Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gulf Canada, Ltd., 111 D.L.R.3d 74 (Can. 1980).
168. 480 F. Supp. at 1148.
169. Cases where a balancing-of-interests test has been used have, for the most part, involved separate and independent foreign interests. See Societe Internationale, S.A. v. Rogers,
357 U.S. 197 (1958). In this case involving the Swiss banking laws, the Court reversed n default judgment that had been entered against the plaintiff for noncompliance with a discovery
order for secret documents. The Court held that since it was unreasonable to require a party to
run the risk of criminal prosecution abroad to comply with a discovery order, the trial judge
should allow him to proceed with his case without the missing evidence. 357 U.S. at 211-13.
In a similar instance involving the effect of the Bahamian foreign exchange laws on the resolution of an American tax fraud case, the Second Circuir held that no court should require a
party to violate foreign law. United States v. Ross, 302 F.2d 831, 834 (2d Cir. 1962). In each
case, the foreign interest was independent of any interests that the United States had in the
outcome of the controversy.
170. See text following note 190 infra. An analogous problem arises in conflict-of-laws
cases, where courts are often called upon to choose between the competing interests of two
sovereigns. One distinguished commentator has argued that in such situations the forum court
should be required to apply its own law, because "assessment of the respective values of the
competing legitimate interests of two sovereign states, in order to determine which is to prevail,
is a political function of a very high order. This is a function which should not be committed
to courts in a democracy." Currie, Notes on Methods and Objectives in the Conflict of Laws,
1959 DUKE L. REV. 171, 176, reprinted in ]. MARTIN, PERSPECTIVES ON CONFLICT OF LAWS
81, 81 (1980).
171. The most outstanding case in point is In re Uranium Antitrust Litigation, 617 F.2d
1248 (7th Cir. 1980), qjfg. 473 F. Supp. 382 (N.D. Ill. 1979), where the court apparently used
the multipart comity analysis suggested in K. BREWSTER, supra note 10, at -446, and considered
the briefs arnici curiae filed by the British, Canadian, and other governments opposing juris-
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weigh American more heavily than foreign interests. 172 Under these
circumstances, the court would have to struggle to avoid leaving itself open to the charge, often leveled in conflict-of-laws cases, 173 that
the rationale advanced for the result is little more than an elaborate
smokescreen to conceal the inevitability of the preordained conclusion.174 And the British have repeatedly stated that what they really
care about are the results, not the reasoning in the American antitrust cases. 175 Even if analytically sound, therefore, a comity analysis would not mend relations with the British.
In the unlikely event that the British expressed satisfaction with
the comity approach, problems would remain. The approach is so
vague 176 that virtually no British company could rely upon it. 177
diction, but found that the district court had correctly determined that it had subject-matter
jurisdiction and that it was proper to have exercised it. 617 F.2d at 1255-56. The opinion of
the Seventh Circuit created a diplomatic incident. Letter from Roberts B. Owen, supra note
IO. The district court opinion helped to prompt the enactment of the PTIA in the first place.
See notes 138-44 supra and accompanying text.
172. In In re Uranium Antitrust Litigation, 480 F. Supp. I 138, 1149 (N.D. Ill. 1979), for
example, the court concluded: "[W]e have earlier observed [that] a balancing test is inherently
unworkable in this case, and were it not we would be hard pressed not to accede to the strong
national policy of this country to enforce vigorously its anti-trust laws." And in United Nuclear Corp. v. General Atomic Co., - N.M. -, -, 629 P.2d 231, 269 n.58 (1980), cert. denied,
IOI S. Ct. 1966 (1981), the New Mexico Supreme Court emphasized that the "fundamental
public policy" expressed in the American antitrust laws must take precedence over notions of
international comity. See note 193 in.fra.
173. A. EHRENZWEIG, A TREATISE ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS§ 122 (1962). See R. LEFLAR, supra note 80, at§ 91.
174. In any event, it is doubtful that Britain would "accept that American courts are the
most suitable bodies to weigh" its interests. Lowe, supra note I, at 268. A Justice of the
Supreme Court of Ontario has expressed especially vehement disagreement with those courts,
e.g., Timberlane Lumber, that venture to "balance" foreign political interests against those of
the United States:
I suppose everybody else here is too polite to ask how it is that a judge of a Canadian
court or of an American court can decide what is the proper balance of international
interests, the interests for example, of Canada in the exploitation of its natural resources
and the interests of this country [the United States] in the maintenance of competition. I
feel that this is not a good area for the judiciary.
Blair, The Canadian Experience, in PERSPECTIVES, supra note 23, at 67.
175. See 980 PARL. DEB., H.C. (5th ser.) 1147-48 (1980) (colloquy between John Nott and
Jeffery Thomas) (agreeing that the Mannington-Timberlane test represents only a step in the
right direction, and not anything like an ultimate solution).
Support by analogy may be drawn from another instance wherein the United States sought
to regulate international competition through an amendment to the antitrust laws. When the
United States offered to temper the Oil Windfall Acquisition Act of 1979 with a statutory
reference to "the principles of international law and comity," S. 1246, 96th Cong., 1st Sess.,
§ 7B(j) (1979), it was promptly rebuffed. Diplomatic Note of the Embassy of the United Kingdom to the United States Department of State (Oct. I, 1979), reprinted in Senate Oil Hearings,
supra note 51, at 902. The British noted in particular that "[t]he safeguard proposed by the
United States Administration with regard to the application of international law and comity is
welcome as an indication that the international aspects are recognised but does not remove the
British Government's basic concern." Id.
176. See text at notes 122-26 supra.
177. In testifying on the Oil Windfall Acquisition Act of 1979 before the Senate Judiciary
Committee, former Under Secretary of State George W. Ball commented: "Reliance on such
vague principles [as "comity" and "international law"] and on the differing views of different
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More importantly, however, applying a comity analysis to the question of whether to enjoin a British defendant from bringing suit
under the PTIA would indicate an inclination to recognize the validity of similar laws, thereby encouraging other nations to enact
them. 178 Since several other countries have expressed their determination to pursue this course, 179 a willingness on the part of American
courts to respect foreign anti-Sherman Act laws would effectively
nullify section 4 of the Clayton Act in many foreign commerce cases.
Finally, to the extent that balancing is appropriate and feasible,
courts should refrain from striking a new balance at the post-judgment stage. There is ample opportunity to balance American and
British interests before taking jurisdiction, during the trial, and when
considering what form of relief is appropriate. If American interests
were sufficiently important to induce the court to take jurisdiction
and render judgment, they also are sufficiently important to justify
enforcing that judgment. 18° Fairness to plaintiffs, moreover, demands that courts enforce lawfully obtained judgments. 181 Antitrust
litigation is enormously time-consuming and expensive, 182 and
courts that are unwilling to protect their final judgments because of
judges would mean, in practical terms, that affected [foreign] companies would pass up profitable transactions - to the great disadvantage of our country." Senate Oil Hearings, supra note
51, at 686 (remarks of George Ball). The point is that the actual effect of applying a comity
analysis, because of the uncertainty, is likely to be precisely the same as it would have been
had comity not been used. British companies will tend to obey American laws simply to avoid
running the risk of incurring possibly ruinous antitrust liabilities. See Lowe, supra note 1, at
269.
178. The invitation to do so is clear. As George Ball noted in his testimony before the
Senate Judiciary Committee, comity could not succeed, in the long run, because:
I can't think of a government that wouldn't pass a law to direct its own firms, in its own
country, to disregard the American statute. Then we would have a problem of conflict
and comity [and] we would have to sort the whole thing out. But it would be a very big

mess.

Senate Oil Hearings, supra note 51, at 696 (remarks of George Ball).

179. See note 50 supra.
180. To take adjudicatory jurisdiction over an antitrust case, the court need only find that
the defendant's behavior slightly affected American commerce. See Timberlane Lumber Co.
v. Bank of America, 549 F.2d 597,613 (9th Cir. 1976). Although jurisdiction may be refused at
this stage because the conduct does not strongly engage American interests, cf. [1979] ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) No. 959, Dec. 13, 1979, at A-3 (slight effect on U.S. commerce of uranium cartel helped persuade the Justice Department to drop suit since U.S.
interests were not sufficiently engaged vis-a-vis the interests of the other nations involved),
"American courts have given little sign of actually declining jurisdiction." Lowe, supra note 1,
at 268 n.57. But the minimum effects threshold for proving a cognizable violation of the antitrust laws is much higher than that necessary to prove that an American court has jurisdiction
over the case. See Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of America, 549 F.2d 597, 613 (9th Cir.
1976). Once the American plaintiff prevails on the merits by proving that it has been injured,
the court may enter a final judgment against the British defendant secure in the knowledge
that the American interest in the case is substantial enough to warrant the issuance of a supporting antisuit injunction.
181. See notes 61-73 supra and accompanying text.
182. See note 35 supra.
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the principle of comity should decline jurisdiction at the outset to
preserve judicial and private resources.
Concern for the separation of powers between the executive
branch and the courts (and for diplomatic repercussions) also should
not lead a court to deny a transnational antisuit injunction. Although the British government may not sit idly by while American
courts prohibit British nations from using the PTIA, 183 simple judicial activity is unlikely to interfere substantially with the conduct of
foreign affairs. Because no political question is presented here, 184 a
court need only attempt to balance American and British interests. 185
When striking that balance, the court may wish to consider the views
of the State Department, 186 but the separation of powers doctrine is
not offended if the court ultimately rejects those views. 187
183. See note ll0supra.
184. The political question doctrine, based upon the constitutional separation of powers
between the judiciary and the executive branch, see Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 210 (1962)
("The nonjusticiability of a political question is primarily a function of the separation of powers."), is applicable only in exceptional cases, such as those involving the validity of treaties.
See, e.g., Goldwater v. Carter, 444 U.S. 996, 1002 (1979) (plurality opinion) (declining to adjudicate dispute between Senate and President Carter over the unilateral Presidential termination of treaty with Taiwan).
185. The Court has co=ented:
Despite the broad statement in Oetjen [v. Central Leather Co., 246 U.S. 297 (1918)] that
"The conduct of the foreign relations of our Government is committed by the Constitution to the Executive and Legislative . . . Departments," 246 U.S., at 302, it cannot of
course be thought that "every case or controversy which touches foreign relations lies
beyond judicial cognizance."
Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. at 423 (quoting Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186,
211 (1962)).
In United States v. First Natl. City Bank, 396 F.2d 897, 901 (1968), the Second Circuit
recognized that it "must take care not to impinge upon the prerogatives and responsibilities of
the political branches of the government in the extremely sensitive and delicate area of foreign
affairs." But complete deference to the policies of foreign governments is presumably not
required. All that the courts need undertake is a "careful balancing of the interests involved."
396 F.2d at 901.
186. See United States v. First Natl. City Bank, 379 U.S. 378, 384-85 (1965). The conferees at a recent seminar on the Anglo-American antitrust dispute agreed that one possible solution to the impass would be to require the United States courts to notify the State Department
when international antitrust cases are filed so that the Department could furnish relevant information for accepting or not accepting jurisdiction. See Hermann, Sanctions, subsidiaries
and the long arm of U.S. justice, Financial Times (London), May 6, 1980, at 13, col. l; [1980]
ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) No. 969, June 19, 1980, at A-6 to -8 (reporting on
conference sponsored by the Ditchley Foundation).
187. The State Department, as the representative of the executive department of the government, may only reco=end a given course of conduct to the courts, and may not decree the
result. The final determination of the controversy at hand must rest with the courts. See L.
HENKIN, supra note 125, at 60, 60 n. *. In New England Merchants Natl. Bank v. Iran Power
Generation & Transmission Co., 502 F. Supp. 120, 133-34 (S.D.N.Y. 1980), for example, the
court refused the government's request for a stay of the attachment proceedings pending the
outcome of the Iranian Hostages affair. The court dismissed the government's claim
perfunctorily:
In large measure . . . [the government's request] is based on foreign policy considerations.
I must balance this request and the fact that the management of foreign affairs is the
exclusive prerogative of the President with the duties imposed on my office by the Constitution to fairly and justly decide. issues brought before this Court.
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Finally, whatever the practical and analytic shortcomings of a
comity approach to the antisuit injunction problem, one could argue
that, in political terms, it remains the most expedient alternative.
Parliament enacted the PTIA partly to promote "discussion and negotiation" 188 by forcing the United States "to be reasonable about
the matters with which the . . . [Act] deals." 189 The flexibility of the
comity approach may foster the nonconfrontational atmosphere of
mutual cooperation and consultation so necessary to the conclusion
of a negotiated settlement to the issues that divide Great Britain and
the United States. 190 But it will do so only by sacrificing American
505 F. Supp. at 133 (footnote omitted). Though the court did not feel called upon to cite
authority for the quoted proposition, the law on this point seems well established. Bui cf.
Dames & Moore v. Regan, 101 S. Ct. 2972, 2991 (1981) ("But where . . . the settlement of
claims has been determined to be a necessary incident to the resolution of a major foreign
policy dispute between our country and another, and where . . . we can conclude that Congress acquiesced in the President's action, we are not prepared to say that the President lacks
the power to settle such claims."). Over a century ago, the Supreme Court declared that it is
beyond the legislature's - and impliedly also beyond the executive's - power to declare the
result of any given case, once the court determines that it has the power fully to adjudicate the
dispute. United States v. Klein, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 128, 146-48 (1872). See also Cohens v.
Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 404 (1821) (Marshall, C.J.) ("With whatever doubts, with
whatever difficulties, a case may be attended, we must decide it ifit be brought before us. We
have no more right to decline the exercise of jurisdiction which is given, than to usurp that
which is not given. The one or the other would be treason to the Constitution."). Indeed, one
commentator has gone so far as to suggest that "once it appears that a federal court has jurisdiction to decide a class of cases, the Constitution forbids foreclosing determination of the
merits of such cases." Tigar, Judicial Power, the "Political Question Doctrine," and Foreign
Relations, 11 UCLA L. REV. 1135, 1177 (1970) (footnote omitted). The State Department, too,
seems to recognize that its role in cases properly before the courts under article III, U.S.
CoNST. art. III,§§ 1-2, must be purely advisory, and never determinative of the final outcome.
See generally [1980] ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. {BNA) No. 971, July 3, 1980, at A-12
(statement of William T. Lake, Deputy Legal Advisor, United States Department of State);
Becker, 'flze Antitrust Law and Relations with Foreign Nations, 40 DEPT. STATE BULL. 272
(1959). The Justice Department has commented that "[i]n appropriate circumstances, the Department will intervene in private suits as a friend of the court to encourage rulings consistent
with comity." [1981] TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) No. 483, Mar. 30, 1981, at 6 {Speech of Joel
Davidow, Director of Policy Planning for the Antitrust Division of the United States Department of Justice, Mar. 12, 1981). This is encouragement, not dictation. Because the Executive
is essentially powerless to intervene effectively, as it could, say, in a Government (nonprivate)
suit, see, e.g., Burnham, ])a/a Show U.S. Rejected Uranium Carle/ Prosecution, N.Y. Times,
Dec. 4, 1979, at 1, col. 2 (State Department required Justice Department to drop pending suit
against foreign defendants), a recommendation from the State Department cannot bind a
court.
188. 976 PARL. DEB., H.C. (5th ser.) 1048 (1979) (remarks of John Nott). See 405 PARL.
DEB., H.L. (5th Ser.) 1518 (1980) (remarks of Lord Mackay) ("The right way to settle international difficulties in the economic field, as in so many others, is by discussion and negotiation
between Governments. We believe that this Bill will contribute in an important manner to
that process.").
189. 976 PARL. DEB.; H.C. (5th ser.) 1032 (1979) (remarks of Ivan Lawrence). The Act
strengthens the British bargaining position in the antitrust-law negotiations that the British feel
must inevitably follow the Act's implementation. See 973 PARL. DEB., H.C. (5th ser.) 1549
(1979) (remarks of Under-Secretary of State for Trade Norman Tebbit); 405 PARL. DEB., H.L.
{5th ser.) 943 (1980) (remarks of Lord Lloyd) ("It seems to me that the whole intention of the
Government in relation to the Bill is to have a diplomatic flag called an Act of Parliament,
which they can wave at some kind of [international] convention or meeting.").
190. Both the British and the American governments agree that a confrontational ap-
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interests to those of the British. Unless the PTIA is neutralized, at
least in part, the United States will be unable to negotiate an acceptable agreement. Granting antisuit injunctions would move the starting point in the negotiations between the two nations toward some
middle ground.
Even a court unwilling to take this affirmative step to equalize
bargaining power would have difficulty basing a decision against issuing an injunction on the supposed diplomatic expediency of "flexibility." "There are," as the British realize quite well, "aspects of
United States law which the State Department cannot change." 191
Although no law commands the court to exercise its discretion to
issue an antisuit injunction, 192 the policies expressed in the antitrust
laws leave the court little freedom to deny a plaintiffs request for
injunctive relief. 193 Refusing the antisuit injunction would be tantamount to awarding only simple damages, which section 4 of the
Clayton Act impliedly forbids. 194 An antitrust plaintiff is entitled to
treble damages, and requires the aid of an antisuit injunction to secure them. Until Congress amends section 4, the court should issue
the injunction. 195
proach could accomplish little since a "cooperative approach" is the one that holds out the
most promise for an end to the differences that divide the two countries. See PARL. DEB., H.C.
STANDING COMM. F, Dec. 4, 1979, at 30, 33 (remarks of Eric Ogden and John Nott) (quoting
diplomatic dispatch from the United States to the United Kingdom; paraphrasing reply of the
United Kingdom to the United States) (For extensive quotations from both dispatches, see 1 J.
ATWOOD & K. BREWSTER, supra note 2, § 4.18, at 104-05.). See generally Marcuss & Butland,
Reconciling National Interests in the Regulation of International Business, l Nw. J. INTL. L. &
Bus. 349, 356 (1979) ("As a practical matter, adherence to comity is facilitated when legislation
which sets out policy objectives leaves wide latitude for administrative implementation.").
191. PARL. DEB., H.C. STANDING COMM. F, Dec. 4, 1979, at 33 (remarks of John Nott);
PARL. DEB., H.C. STANDING COMM. F, Dec. 6, 1979, at 73 (remarks of John Nott).
192. See text at note 130 supra.
193. C.f. United Nuclear Corp. v. General Atomic Co., - N.M. -, 629 P.2d 231 (1980),
cert. denied, 101 S. Ct. 1966 (1981). In this case upholding an antitrust judgment under New
Mexico law that "approache[d] one billion dollars," - N.M. at -, 629 P.2d at 237, the court
quickly dismissed the notion that international comity should stay its hand: "We cannot subscribe to the idea that thefandamental public policy which the [New Mexico state] antitrust
laws embody must be ignored in the interests of comity towards the policy of a foreign state
...." - N.M. at-, 629 P.2d at 269 n.58 (emphasis added).
194. Clayton Act § 4, 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1976).
In discussing similar problems that arise in conflict-of-laws cases, Brainerd Currie has
noted that
[t]he sensible . . . thing for any court to do, [when] confronted with a true conflict of
interests, is to apply its own law. . . . It should .•. [do so] simply because a court should
never apply any other law except when there is a good reason for doing so. That doing so
will promote the interests of a foreign state at the expense of the interests of the forum
state is not a good reason.
Currie, Married Women's Contracts: A Study in the Conflicts ofLaws, 25 U. CHI. L. REV. 227,
261-62 (1958) (footnote omitted), reprinted in J. MARTIN, supra note 170, at 110, 110.
195. C.f. Rahl, International Application ofAmerican Antitrust Laws: Issues and Proposals,
2 Nw. J. INTL. L. & Bus. 336, 363 (1980) ("Comity is a laudable and indeed essential idea in
international relations. As a ground for outright dismissal of a cause of action otherwise authorized by Congress, however, it gives rise to some problems. . . . Absent Congressional
approval, by what right may a court exercise such discretion?").
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CONCLUSION

The PTIA threatens to deny treble damages to antitrust plaintiffs
that do business in Great Britain. To protect these vulnerable plaintiffs, an American court should enjoin British defendants from pursuing their rights under the Act.
The analysis leading to this conclusion proceeds in two parts.
First, the American interest in enforcing the antitrust laws in foreign
commerce is compelling. Free competition is a far more important
policy than those that courts often rely upon in issuing transnational
antisuit injunctions. Since the private treble damages suit, directly
threatened by the British Act, plays a key role in preserving this interest, the court should issue the injunction. Second, because the Act
merely reflects the British financial and political interest in a controlled economy, it presents a case logically indistinguishable from
the many instances in which American courts normally issue transnational antisuit injunctions. 196
Practical difficulties do not change the legal analysis. Fears of a
ruinous series of counterinjunctions should prove illusory. Retaliation from the British government poses a harder problem, and the
temptation to defer to the State Department may be great. But not
issuing an antisuit injunction would constitute the functional
equivalent of an award for only simple damages. Though the State
Department may object to the injunction, the court cannot abdicate
its responsibility to carry out the clear command of section 4 of the
Clayton Act.
The argument for issuing the injunction is therefore compelling.
Objections reduce to the proposition that the American antitrust
laws are not "suitable instrument[s] for the regulation of world
trade." 197 Vigorous private extraterritorial enforcement of the antitrust laws may well "damage the fabric of international commerce,"198 and Congress eventually may decide to amend the
Clayton Act to provide for the award of simple, rather than treble
damages in cases arising under the foreign commerce provisions of
the antitrust laws. 199 But this decision cannot rest with the courts.
Until Congress changes the law, an American court should do everything within its power to insure that the antitrust plaintiff continues
to receive "threefold the damages by him sustained."200
196. See note 80 supra.
197. Wash. Post, Nov. 4, 1979, § C, at 6, cols. 1-2 (Editorial Page).
198. Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506, 517 (1974) (forum selection clause
upheld).
199. See 2 J. ATWOOD & K. BREWSTER, supra note 2, § 18.32, at 341 (proposing that§ 4 of
the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1976), be amended to provide for the award of only simple
damages in cases arising under the foreign commerce provisions of the antitrust laws).
200. Clayton Act § 4, 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1976).

